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ARTICLES 
Property Lost in Translation 
Abraham Bell† & Gideon Parchomovsky†† 
The world is full of localized, nonstandard property regimes that coexist 
alongside state property laws. This Article provides the first comprehensive look at 
the phenomenon of localized property systems and the difficulties that necessarily 
attend the translation of localized property rights. 
Rather than survey the numerous localized property systems in the world, 
this Article explores the common features of the interaction between localized and 
state property systems. All localized property systems entail translation costs with 
the wider state property systems around them. Translation costs result from in-
compatibilities, as well as information and enforcement costs. Focusing on transla-
tion costs, the Article examines the pressures for localized systems to converge into 
larger state systems, as well as the features of localized property that may keep it 
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distinct. Additionally, it shows that state protection of localized property systems 
(such as Norwegian protection of the property rights of the indigenous Sámi peo-
ple) may sometimes lower translation costs but may also lower the utility of the lo-
calized systems through poor incorporation into state law. 
Understanding localized property systems has important implications for 
understanding the nature of property. Property law systems, like other legal sys-
tems, have greater utility with greater numbers of adherents. Thus, using the in-
sights of the economics of network effects is crucial to understanding property. An-
other potential insight stemming from our analysis is in the theory of commons 
property: translation costs must be taken into account when examining collective 
action solutions to tragedies of the commons. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Property, we are told, is a matter of state law.1 But the 
world is full of localized, nonstandard property regimes that  
 
 1 See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc v Florida Department of Environmental 
Protection, 130 S Ct 2592, 2597 (2010) (“Generally speaking, state law defines property 
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coexist alongside state property laws. For instance, anthropolo-
gists, economists, and legal scholars have eagerly analyzed 
property and quasi-property arrangements such as Native 
American tribal property,2 informal property rights in favelas in 
Brazil,3 the rights of the nomad Sámi in Scandinavia,4 Bedouin 
rights in the Middle East,5 and collective property in kibbutzim 
in Israel.6 
 
interests.”); Barnhill v Johnson, 503 US 393, 398 (1992) (“‘[P]roperty’ and ‘interests in 
property’ are creatures of state law.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitu-
tional Property, 86 Va L Rev 885, 920 (2000) (stating that property interests are created 
by state law).   
 2 See, for example, Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property 
Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 Vand L Rev 1559, 1599–1600 (2001); Su-
san B. Bruning, Complex Legal Legacies: The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act, Scientific Study, and Kennewick Man, 71 Am Antiquity 501, 507–13 
(2006); Heather A. Weckbaugh, Comment, Federal Indian Law, 76 Denver U L Rev 845, 
869–74 (1999); Jérémie Gilbert, Nomadic Territories: A Human Rights Approach to No-
madic Peoples’ Land Rights, 7 Hum Rts L Rev 681, 685–92 (2007). 
 3 See, for example, Colin Crawford, The Social Function of Property and the Hu-
man Capacity to Flourish, 80 Fordham L Rev 1089, 1105 (2011); Ngai Pindell, Finding a 
Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil and in the United States, 
39 Vand J Transnatl L 435, 445–47 (2006); Greg O’Hare, Urban Renaissance: New Hori-
zons for Rio’s Favelas, 86 Geography 61, 62 (2001); Edesio Fernandes, The Regulariza-
tion of Favelas in Brazil—The Case of Belo Horizonte, 2 Soc & Leg Stud 211, 220–31 
(1993) (describing the movement to grant legal title to favela dwellers); Winter King, Il-
legal Settlements and the Impact of Titling Programs, 44 Harv Intl L J 433, 440, 442–44 
(2003) (suggesting that gentrification of favelas will not occur without the lure of title 
ownership). 
 4 See, for example, Else Grete Broderstad, The Promises and Challenges of Indige-
nous Self-Determination: The Sami Case, 66 Intl J 893, 903 (2011); Tom G. Svensson, 
Ethnopolitics among the Sámi in Scandinavia: A Basic Strategy toward Local Autonomy, 
39 Arctic 208, 210–11 (1986); Tom G. Svensson, Industrial Developments and the Sámi: 
Ethnopolitical Response to Ecological Crisis in the North, 29 Anthropologica 131, 141–42 
(1987); Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: Convergence from a 
Nordic Perspective, 20 UCLA J Envir L & Pol 237, 282–87 (2001/2002); Gilbert, 7 Hum 
Rts L Rev at 710 (cited in note 2) (discussing how usage rights to hunt across borders 
were protected as early as 1751); Ivar Bjørkland, Sámi Reindeer Pastoralism as an In-
digenous Resource Management System in Northern Norway: A Contribution to the 
Common Property Debate, 21 Dev & Change 75, 76–77 (1990) (describing Sámi reindeer 
pastoralism as the shared management of herds despite individual ownership of the animals).  
 5 See, for example, Yehuda Gruenberg, Note, Not All Who Wander Should Be Lost: 
The Rights of Indigenous Bedouins in the Modern State of Israel, 34 Brooklyn J Intl L 
185, 189 (2008); Michael Ginguld, Avi Perevolotsky, and Eugene D. Ungar, Living on the 
Margins: Livelihood Strategies of Bedouin Herd-Owners in the Northern Negev, Israel, 25 
Hum Ecol 567, 571–73 (1997); Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins under the 
Law of Israel, 30 L & Socy Rev 231, 237 (1996); Havatzelet Yahel, Land Disputes be-
tween the Negev Bedouin and Israel, 11 Israel Stud 1, 8–14 (2006). 
 6 See, for example, Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315, 
1347–48 (1993); Amir Helman, The Israeli Kibbutz as a Socialist Model, 148 J Inst & 
Theoretical Econ 168, 170–71 (1992); M. Keren, D. Levhari, and M. Byalsky, On the Sta-
bility and Viability of Co-operatives: The Kibbutz as an Example, 56 Acta Oeconomica 
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Localized property arrangements are not restricted to cul-
turally distinct groups. They can be found in certain indus-
tries—think, for example, of the quasi-property rights in landing 
slots in airports7—or certain activities, such as the virtual prop-
erty of gamers.8 Indeed, they can be found in nearly all situa-
tions. Consider, for instance, the informal “ownership” arrange-
ments that characterize the typical household.9 
In one sense, this potpourri of localized property and quasi-
property regimes shares nothing in common. Some emerged 
from longstanding and venerable traditions, others were shaped 
by ideology, and others still were born of necessity or conven-
ience. Some are held together by contract or other legal tools, 
and others by custom or social convention. Unsurprisingly, while 
each of these regimes has been studied on a stand-alone basis, 
no one has ever thought to link them all. Seemingly, there is 
nothing so local as localized property arrangements. 
But, as we show in this Article, the very diversity of dissimi-
lar-property and quasi-property systems gives rise to an im-
portant and ubiquitous aspect of property laws. In this Article, 
we argue that examining localized property regimes as a phe-
nomenon, together with the problems encountered by property-
holders in such regimes, shows us that property rules—in every 
environment—are highly contingent on the networks in which 
they operate. Property rules of one network must frequently in-
teract with different and sometimes inconsistent rules of anoth-
er network. 
In other words, property rules are always limited to a social 
context, and they are always vulnerable to incompatibility with 
other property rules. In order for alternative localized property 
arrangements to be incorporated effectively into the property 
system of the jurisdiction in which they exist, they must be deci-
phered and translated. The need for deciphering and translating 
dramatically increases the cost of maintaining alternative  
 
301, 304–05 (2006); J. Weisman, The Kibbutz: Israel’s Collective Settlement, 1 Israel L 
Rev 99, 115–21 (1966).  
 7 See William H. Riker and Itai Sened, A Political Theory of the Origin of Property 
Rights: Airport Slots, 35 Am J Polit Sci 951, 953–56 (1991); Itai Sened and William H. 
Riker, Common Property and Private Property: The Case of Air Slots, 8 J Theor Polit 427, 
429–33 (1996). 
 8 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 BU L Rev 1047, 1052–53 (2005); 
F. Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 Cal L Rev 1, 
30–34 (2004). 
 9 See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights 
around the Hearth, 116 Yale L J 226, 277–87 (2006). 
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property regimes and correspondingly diminishes the value of 
assets and resources held under such regimes. Naturally, the 
more complex or idiosyncratic these regimes are the greater the 
cost incurred by the group adopting them. 
The core insight may be explained by reference to the eco-
nomic term “network effects.”10 Essentially, we argue that all le-
gal property arrangements are characterized by network effects. 
The value of legal regimes increases with the number of people 
(or assets) subject to them. In that sense, the law is akin to a 
technological standard.11 Adopters of the legal standards in-
crease the value of their assets; those who opt out can only do so 
at the cost of lowering the value of their assets. Like technology, 
property needs to develop over time, requiring the development 
of new standards and the abandonment of old ones. Transition-
ing between standards is costly and difficult. Sometimes,  
 
 10 For discussions of the term “network effects” in legal contexts, see Mark A. Lem-
ley and David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal L Rev 
479, 483 (1998); Howard A. Shelanski and J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in 
Network Industries, 68 U Chi L Rev 1, 5 (2001) (“A network externality, or ‘network ef-
fect,’ exists when the value of a product or service increases with the breadth of demand 
for that product or service.”). See also Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent De-
mand for a Communications Service, 5 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 16, 19–26 (1974); Stanley 
M. Besen and Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization, 8 J Econ Persp 117, 119–21 (Spring 1994); Michael L. Katz and Carl 
Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J Indust Econ 55, 57–60 
(1992); Garth Saloner, Economic Issues in Computer Interface Standardization, 1 Econ 
Innov & New Tech 135, 142–45 (1990); Stanley M. Besen and Garth Saloner, The Eco-
nomics of Telecommunications Standards, in Robert W. Crandall and Kenneth Flamm, 
eds, Changing the Rules: Technological Change, International Competition, and Regula-
tion in Communications 177, 178–89 (Brookings 1989); Janusz A. Ordover and Garth 
Saloner, Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust, in Richard Schmalensee and Robert 
D. Willig, eds, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 537, 563–64 (North-Holland 1989); 
Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am Econ Rev 940, 954 (1986); Michael L. Katz 
and Carl Shapiro, Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological Progress, 
38 Oxford Econ Papers 146, 154–58 (Supp 1986); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, 
Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J Polit Econ 822, 830–
39 (1986); Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Inno-
vation, 16 RAND J Econ 70, 72–74 (1985); Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Network 
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am Econ Rev 424, 426–34 (1985). 
 11 See Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 
8 J Econ Persp 93, 96–97 (Spring 1994); Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 117–19 
(cited in note 10); John T. Soma and Kevin B. Davis, Network Effects in Technology Mar-
kets: Applying the Lessons of Intel and Microsoft to Future Clashes between Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property, 8 J Intel Prop L 1, 3–4 (2000) (stating that the need for compatibil-
ity between machines coupled with network effects propels pioneering technology com-
panies to monopolies). 
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pockets of holdouts remain with the old standard, even as the 
new standard conquers the market.12 
Our core insight also suggests an important refinement to 
the study of the evolution of property institutions. It suggests 
that once a society-wide property standard emerges, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to preserve alternative localized regimes. 
This is because the cost of deviating from the societal standard 
will tend to increase over time. Consider the example of the kib-
butzim in Israel. The kibbutzim were founded on the basis of a 
shared, strong socialist ideology that shunned private property.13 
Originally, kibbutzim absolutely prohibited private property; 
members who sought to acquire private property were banished 
from the community. However, over time, socialism declined in 
popularity in Israel, and private property arrangements became 
more popular in the society at large. As private property became 
the norm in Israel, two things happened in the kibbutzim: First, 
the cost of adhering to collective property arrangements within 
the kibbutz increased, and second, the socialist ideology that 
was once the hallmark of the kibbutzim declined in popularity. 
As a result, kibbutzim gradually transitioned from collective 
property to private property; that is, they gradually swapped 
their idiosyncratic, localized socialist property system for one 
that was closer to the free market, private property system used 
by the surrounding society. Nowadays, only a few kibbutzim re-
tain a collective property system; all the rest—several hundred 
of them—have succumbed to the pressure and opted for some 
version of private property.14 
The general lesson is simple. Once a certain property ar-
rangement becomes the standard in any given jurisdiction, 
chances increase that alternative localized property regimes will 
have to adjust over time to the norm. Of course, we are not sug-
gesting that over time there will be perfect convergence. Alter-
native property regimes may survive in the long run for a varie-
ty of reasons. First, the cost of bringing them into conformity 
with the standard may be too high. This may be the case with 
the informal property arrangements in the favelas in Rio de 
 
 12 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 106 (cited in note 11). See also Henry 
Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 Am L & Econ Rev 1, 6–7 (2006) (describing the 
possibility of network effects discouraging innovation in corporate charters). 
 13 See Part I.A.2. 
 14 See Part I.A.2. 
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Janeiro and elsewhere in Brazil.15 Second, sometimes localized 
gains may create an interest group strong enough to prevent 
convergence even at a cost to general welfare. This can be most 
easily seen in certain kinds of political resistance to change.16 
Third, the general population may have a preference for preserv-
ing an alternative regime and may even be willing to subsidize 
it, as may be the case with the attitude of the Norwegians to the 
Sámi.17 
The remainder of this Article elaborates this central claim 
and unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we discuss the phenomenon 
of localized property and quasi-property regimes. We demon-
strate the ubiquity of such regimes and analyze their roots. In 
Part II, we study the interaction between localized arrange-
ments and the property systems that surround them. We show 
that to varying degrees all localized property forms give rise to 
the problem of translation—the process by which localized ar-
rangements are operationalized within the external property 
framework. We also show that the need for translation dimin-
ishes the value of alternative property arrangements for rights 
holders. Furthermore, it creates an evolutionary pressure on 
such forms and presents them with the choice of “comply or die.” 
In Part III, we explore the circumstances in which localized 
property systems will successfully resist convergence. We show 
that while these examples are numerous, this is not due to the 
absence of translation concerns but rather because other factors 
prevent full translation of localized property systems into the 
property systems of larger jurisdictions. Given this background, 
we show that we should expect to continue seeing partially in-
compatible property systems despite translation costs. In Part 
IV, we explore the implications of our analysis for ongoing prop-
erty debates. These debates include the effectiveness of manag-
ing resources in the commons by tightly knit communities, the 
conditions under which semicommons prove a viable stage in the 
evolution of property rights, and the applicability of economist 
Hernando de Soto’s observations about the importance of formal-
ized property rights. A short conclusion follows.  
 
 15 See Part I.B.1. 
 16 See Part III.A. 
 17 See Part I.A.3. 
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I.  THE CREATION OF LOCALIZED PROPERTY 
In this Part, we analyze the widespread phenomenon of lo-
calized property arrangements. Such arrangements may arise 
on a relatively large scale that encompasses ethnic, socioeconom-
ic, or ideological groups, or on a more modest scale that is lim-
ited to certain neighborhoods or even households. We define “lo-
calized property rights” to mean in rem arrangements that 
govern the rights and duties of individuals with respect to re-
sources that avail against all the individual members of a cer-
tain group or community. Accordingly, localized property rights 
are analogous but not identical to formal property rights. For-
mal property rights grant in rem protection that avails against 
all persons within a legal jurisdiction18 while localized property 
rights avail only against persons within the localized group. 
Despite their more limited scope, from the vantage point of 
the relevant community or locality, localized property rights 
may be more important than formal property arrangements. Lo-
calized property norms may be better tailored to the local com-
munity’s economic needs or more consistent with the communi-
ty’s ideological preferences or cultural heritage. Even where 
localized property rules lack formal legal backing, they may 
prove durable and enforceable. Localized property rules may be 
enforceable by extralegal measures. For instance, the group may 
impose social penalties such as ostracism or even extralegal 
penalties such as violence against group members that violate 
the rules of a localized property regime.19 
Localized property arrangements, on various scales, can be 
seen everywhere. In the Introduction, we mentioned the norms 
that evolved among various indigenous groups,20 but, in fact,  
localized property arrangements exist in many other settings 
that permeate our daily lives. Professor Richard Epstein, for ex-
ample, described a relatively elaborate system of property rights 
that evolved in different localities in the United States with  
 
 18 See Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 
101 Colum L Rev 773, 777 (2001) (“Property rights, on the other hand, are in rem—they 
bind ‘the rest of the world.’”). 
 19 See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J 
Econ Persp 137, 148–53 (Summer 2000). For a general discussion of the penalties im-
posed in order to enforce social norms, see Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 89–94 
(Harvard 2000). 
 20 See notes 2–6 and accompanying text.  
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respect to on-street parking spaces.21 Similar rights may be seen 
in the arrangements that attend reserving racquetball courts or 
other recreational areas.22 But perhaps an even more familiar 
example can be found in the rights and duties that arise among 
college roommates. Roommates typically co-own the lease rights 
to the realty in which they dwell. In addition, they may pur-
chase various home appliances, electronic devices, and computer 
equipment together. As roommates acquire property, they devel-
op a system of rules that govern exclusion, use, and transfer of 
the assets. 
Naturally, an in-depth discussion of all localized property 
arrangements is beyond the scope of this Article. Each arrange-
ment deserves its own article, if not book. We will confine our-
selves, therefore, to a few chosen examples that represent the 
broader phenomenon. The examples we discuss at a greater 
length in this Article include the kibbutzim in Israel, the favelas 
in Brazil, and the property rights of the Sámi in Norway, and 
Native American tribe members in the United States. Even with 
this restricted list, we will only be able to provide a fleeting 
glimpse into those property arrangements. As should be clear, 
we do not presume to make an anthropological contribution. Ra-
ther, we hope to advance our understanding of property theory 
and the examples are offered strictly to this end. That said, our 
examples, or case studies, are varied and cover a wide array of 
property settings. In fact, it is precisely the diversity of property 
options that can be found in our case studies that assure us that 
the general theoretical conclusions are of general applicability 
and are not dependent on any particular design of localized 
property arrangements. 
A. “Official” Localized Property Regimes 
We begin our examples of localized property regimes by 
looking at several “official” ones. By describing these regimes as 
official, we mean that even though the localized regimes employ 
property rules distinct from those in the wider legal jurisdiction, 
they nevertheless enjoy some kinds of formal legal recognition. 
 
 21 Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 
J Legal Stud S515, S521–43 (2002).  
 22 See Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1386–87 (cited in note 6). Consider Douglas Lay-
cock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Pri-
vate Speakers, 81 Nw U L Rev 1, 19 (1986) (describing the process of reserving time in 
public parks as not involving governmental support or endorsement). 
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Native American (or “Indian”) property, for instance, is the sub-
ject of numerous federal laws and regulations. However, despite 
the official recognition, the localized regimes remain distinct. 
Different rules apply to Native American property, and the 
property rights within the Native American property regime are 
limited in transferability and in other ways. 
1. Native American tribal property. 
Native American property rights in the United States are a 
peculiar blend of state law and local customs. Native Americans 
were present on the land, and used it, long before the existence 
of the state or the state’s extension of sovereignty to the land. 
Most Native American tribes were popularly known to Europe-
ans as American Indians, and the label continues to be used in 
many contexts today23—particularly to distinguish the American 
Indians from Eskimos (a name considered pejorative in Cana-
da24)—the Native Americans found primarily in Alaska, Siberia, 
Canada, and Greenland.25 We use the terms Native American 
and American Indian interchangeably in this Article. 
Native Americans’ customary property claims predate the 
state but are considered outside the chain of title of formal state-
sanctioned property rights.26 Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
landmark ruling in Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v M’Intosh27 
established the basic rules that have shaped Native American 
property rights for the past two centuries. Under Johnson, the 
root of title in the United States is property rights established 
by European conquerors.28 Any American Indian property rights 
are inferior rights of occupancy only; not only are they inaliena-
ble to private parties and ineligible for being upgraded into 
 
 23 See, for example, Kathryn Walbert, Teaching about American Indians in North 
Carolina: American Indian vs. Native American; A Note on Terminology 1.1 (North Caro-
lina Humanities Council 2009), online at http://www.learnnc.org/lp/editions/nc-american 
-indians/5526 (visited May 9, 2013) (discussing the appropriate use of Native American 
and Indian).  
 24 See Steve Sailer, Name Game—‘Inuit’ or ‘Eskimo’?, UPI (June 20, 2002), online 
at http://www.upi.com/Odd_News/2002/06/20/Feature-Name-game-Inuit-or-Eskimo/UPI 
-43191024597290 (visited May 9, 2013).  
 25 See Jack Utter, American Indians: Answers to Today’s Questions 103–06 (Okla-
homa 2d ed 2001) (surveying the debate over terminology used to distinguish native peo-
ple of North America from non-natives). 
 26 See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M’Intosh and be-
yond, 37 Tulsa L Rev 521, 523–25 (2001). 
 27 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).  
 28 Id at 573.  
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proper title, they may be swept away by fiat of the US govern-
ment.29 At the same time, Johnson preserves for Native Ameri-
can tribes a quasi-sovereign status. This quasi-sovereign status, 
too, is inferior. Native American tribes cannot claim the rights of 
independent states, and their sovereignty can be quashed by the 
United States at will.30 However, so long as and to the degree 
that the United States chooses to respect American Indian sov-
ereignty, the tribes can regulate their internal affairs, including 
internal property rights.31 
As conventional wisdom notes, Native American conceptions 
of property differed greatly from those of the European settlers. 
The evidence suggests that the Native American tribes encoun-
tered by British colonists had a system of semicommons owner-
ship similar to that used in England prior to the enclosure 
movement.32 This meant that large land tracts were owned by 
villages, and the village chiefs allocated use rights and possesso-
ry rights to individual tribe members for agricultural purposes.33 
Other parts of the village land were preserved for nonfarming 
uses, such as gathering wood.34 However, these property rights 
were gradually swept away, sometimes by sales to encroaching 
colonists and sometimes by forcible dispossession.35 
As the United States conquered land to the Pacific, it pro-
gressively reserved Native American quasi-sovereignty to small-
er and smaller areas. Native American land holdings outside 
these reservations practically disappeared.36 Theoretically, the 
reservations became pockets of land where Native American 
property rights held.37 However, repeated US efforts to regulate 
 
 29 Id at 574. 
 30 See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v United States, 348 US 272, 279 (1955). 
 31 See United States v Tsosie, 92 F3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir 1996) (denying a hearing 
in federal court until remedies in tribal court were exhausted); Gooding v Watkins, 142 F 
112, 113 (8th Cir 1905) (applying Chickasaw law in rejecting an adverse possession 
claim).  
 32 For more on the English semicommons, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Prop-
erty Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J Legal Stud 131, 160 (2000). See also 
Part IV.B. 
 33 See Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the 
Frontier 37 (Belknap 2005). 
 34 See id at 37–38.  
 35 See id at 191–226 (describing removal of more than eighty thousand Native 
Americans to the west of the Mississippi from the late 1820s through the early 1840s).  
 36 See id at 235 (describing the US government’s adoption of the reservation ap-
proach in the early 1850s whereby “[v]irtually all Indian land cessions . . . resulted in the 
designation of a circumscribed area in which the selling tribe was to live”). 
 37  See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 236–37 (cited in note 33).  
 
526  The University of Chicago Law Review [80:515 
   
Native American property, with mixed motives and less-than-
perfect knowledge, created a system of property that was sepa-
rate from the usual property law within the states but was not 
quite Native American either.38 
Formally, the United States holds title to the reservation 
lands in trust for the tribes.39 Until the late nineteenth century, 
federal law viewed reservation land as being held in common by 
tribal members.40 However, in 1887, the United States adopted a 
policy of “allotment,” under which reservation land was parti-
tioned into smaller plots that could eventually be individually 
owned by tribal members.41 The Dawes Act,42 which implement-
ed the policy, remained in force until 1934.43 The law maintained 
title in the federal government and allocated interests in trust to 
individual Native Americans for a transitional period.44 During 
the transitional period, the law forbade alienation of the land 
outside the tribe while permitting the sale of leaseholds and 
other lesser interests. Finally, the government claimed for itself 
the right to purchase lands “not allotted.”45 
As a result of the partial privatization, numerous Native 
Americans sold leases and eventually title to their lands, leading 
to a situation in which 86 million of the 138 million acres of res-
ervation land were lost to Native Americans between 1887 and 
 
 38 See James Clifford, Identity in Mashpee, in Jo Carrillo, ed, Readings in American 
Indian Law: Recalling the Rhythm of Survival 19, 21 (Temple 1998) (“In short, the Unit-
ed States will permit Indians a measure of recompense [for taken land] through the law 
. . . but it ultimately makes the rules and arbitrates the game.”); Robert N. Clinton, Re-
dressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 
46 Ark L Rev 77, 125–29 (1993). 
 39 See Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian 
Land Consolidation Act, 85 Iowa L Rev 595, 650–51 (2000); Vickie Enis, Yours, Mine, 
Ours? Renovating the Antiquated Apartheid in the Law of Property Division in Native 
American Divorce, 35 Am Indian L Rev 661, 666–67 (2010–2011); Judith V. Royster, The 
Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz St L J 1, 8 (1995) (“Indian lands set aside as reservations 
were eventually recognized as being ‘in trust’ for the tribes.”). 
 40 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 254 (cited in note 33). 
 41 Dawes Act, ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887), repealed by the Indian Land Consolida-
tion Act Amendments of 2000 § 106(a), Pub L No 106-462, 114 Stat 2007.  
 42  Ch 119, 24 Stat 388 (1887). 
 43 Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-383, ch 576, 48 Stat 984, codi-
fied at 25 USC § 461 et seq (effectively repealing the Dawes Act by forbidding the allot-
ment of land by the government to any Indian). See also Graham D. Taylor, The New 
Deal and American Indian Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization 
Act, 1934–45 19–21 (Nebraska 1980) (recounting the effects of the Indian Reorganization 
Act and the repeal of the Dawes Act). 
 44 Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat at 389. 
 45 Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat at 389. See also Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land 
at 277–78 (cited in note 33).  
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1934.46 The consequence was a serious erosion of Native Ameri-
can communities’ ability to survive cohesively. At the same time, 
the restrictions on alienation of the land created highly fraction-
ated land interests. As the Court explained in Hodel v Irving,47 
“40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple 
undivided interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, 
and many parcels having dozens, of owners. Because the land 
was held in trust and often could not be alienated or partitioned, 
the fractionation problem grew and grew over time.”48  
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193449 ended the allot-
ment policy but could not reaggregate the fractional holdings. 
The US Congress attempted to force consolidation through es-
cheat in the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983,50 but the 
Supreme Court struck down the provision of the law as an un-
constitutional uncompensated taking.51 Restrictions on aliena-
tion of reservation land remain part of US law.52 Today, some 
“allotted lands” remain in trust for Native American tribes 
alongside reservation lands.53 Other lands are held in trust by 
states for Native Americans or held in trust by individual per-
sons or tribes.54 
The end result is a bubble of ethnically limited property 
rights for Native Americans, within a wider system of state law. 
However, the picture for Native Americans is considerably more 
complicated. Native American property is not limited to usage 
rights; Native Americans have actual, though limited title to the 
land. The sovereign rights of Native American tribes are limited, 
but they are considerably greater than those of the Sámi, as we 
shall see.55 This means, among other things, that Native Ameri-
can tribes have considerable authority over land use issues on 
 
 46 See Ronald A. Janke, Population, Reservations, and Federal Indian Policy, in 
Andrew Wiget, ed, Dictionary of Native American Literature 155, 159–60 (Garland 1994).  
 47 481 US 704 (1986). 
 48 Id at 707. 
 49 Pub L No 73-383, ch 576, 48 Stat 984, codified at 25 USC § 461 et seq.  
 50 Indian Land Consolidation Act § 207, Pub L No 97-459, 96 Stat 2515, 2519, codi-
fied as amended at 25 USC § 2206. 
 51 Hodel, 481 US at 716–17. See also Babbitt v Youpee, 519 US 234, 243–44 (1997).  
 52 25 USC § 464 (“Except as provided in this Act, no sale, devise, gift, exchange, or 
other transfer of restricted Indian lands or of shares in the assets of any Indian tribe or 
corporation organized under this Act shall be made or approved.”). 
 53 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land at 287–90 (cited in note 33).  
 54 See Nicholas E. Flanders, Native American Sovereignty and Natural Resource 
Management, 26 Hum Ecol 425, 430–33 (1998). 
 55 See Part I.A.3. 
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reservations.56 Another complication results from the federal 
system that characterizes US but not Norwegian law. Property 
law is generally the province of state law, rather than federal 
law, in the United States. This means that understanding the 
full picture of Native American property law requires examining 
not only the federal law that supplants and controls Native 
American law but also the state law that applies to realty geo-
graphically surrounding Native American land. 
2. Kibbutzim. 
Kibbutzim (kibbutzim is plural for kibbutz) are agricultural 
communes that first developed in Israel a century ago. Tradi-
tionally, the kibbutz, as a collective, consisted of a small number 
of families. 
Degania, the first kibbutz, was established in 1909 by sev-
eral dozen Jewish residents of a part of the Ottoman Empire 
known as Israel or Palestine.57 Kibbutzim rapidly grew in popu-
larity in the country, and today, there are roughly 270 kibbut-
zim in Israel, with a total population of approximately 120 thou-
sand and land holdings of about 550 thousand acres.58 
Most of the founders of Degania were immigrants from Rus-
sia who had arrived in Ottoman Israel/Palestine in the late 
nineteenth century, and they were strongly influenced by the so-
cialist political movements that were popular at the time in 
Russia and, in particular, the Russian Jewish community.59 
They established the kibbutz as an agricultural commune. 
Members of the kibbutz were expected to transfer personal as-
sets to the kibbutz upon joining it. Thus, the kibbutz itself 
owned not only the land but all personal property.60 Thereafter, 
 
 56 See Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness 
in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L Rev 1405, 1419–28 (1997) (describing how res-
idents of the Torres-Martinez reservation dealt with dumping of waste on the reserva-
tion despite feeble help from the federal or California state governments). 
 57 See Yossi Katz, Agricultural Settlements in Palestine, 1882–1914, 50 Jewish Soc 
Stud 63, 75–76 (1988). 
 58 Kibbutz Notebook *6 (The Kibbutz Movement), online at http://www.kibbutz.org.il/ 
tnua/dover/dafdefet_engl.pdf (visited May 9, 2013).  
 59 See Melford E. Spiro, Utopia and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical 
Vicissitudes, 106 Am Anthro 556, 557 (2004). 
 60 See Ran Abramitzky, Lessons from the Kibbutz on the Equality–Incentives Trade-
Off, 25 J Econ Persp 185, 192 (Winter 2011) (noting that a ban on private property was 
among the defining characteristics of the Kibbutz). In general the land “ownership” of 
the kibbutz actually consists of a long-term leasehold from the state of Israel or the Jew-
ish National Fund. For more on land ownership in Israel, see Elia Werczberger and  
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members were to work the land and perform all other tasks nec-
essary for maintenance of the kibbutz. All decisions were made 
by the entire membership of the kibbutz, which would gather in 
the dining hall and debate issues until resolution.61 The kibbutz 
was responsible for providing members with use rights to living 
quarters and living supplies, while maintaining full ownership 
for itself.62 
Traditional kibbutz life was austere. Kibbutz members were 
traditionally rotated through jobs so that members would move 
through all the jobs on the kibbutz, from accounting to dish-
washing.63 Children were raised communally, spending relative-
ly little time with their biological parents.64 Clothing was simple 
and provided by the kibbutz.65 Members were given a small al-
lowance for basic needs, unconnected to the work they per-
formed.66 Kibbutz life was animated by an ideology of radical 
equality, patriotism, Marxism, romantic attraction to “working 
the land,” and self-sacrifice. Societally, kibbutz members were 
viewed in Israeli society as both highly patriotic and as salt of 
the earth; they were traditionally overrepresented in the most 
demanding and dangerous army units.67 In the early years of the 
state, kibbutzim enjoyed rapid growth, growing to 67,550 mem-
bers and 214 kibbutzim by 1950.68 However, by the 1960s, the 
rapid growth began to stall.69 
 
Eliyahu Borukhov, The Israel Land Authority: Relic or Necessity?, 16 Land Use Pol 129, 
132–37 (1999). 
 61 See Richard D. Schwartz, Democracy and Collectivism in the Kibbutz, 5 Soc 
Probs 137, 141–45 (1957). 
 62 See Bruno Bettelheim, The Children of the Dream: Communal Child-Rearing 
and American Education 351 (Avon 1969); Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 560–61 (cited in note 59).  
 63 See Tal Simons and Paul Ingram, Enemies of the State: The Interdependence of 
Institutional Forms and the Ecology of the Kibbutz, 1910–1997, 48 Admin Sci Q 592, 593 
(2003), citing A.D. Gordon, Selected Essays 63 (League for Labor Palestine 1938) 
(Frances Burnce, trans).  
 64 See Bettelheim, Children of the Dream at 31–34 (cited in note 62); Sharone L. 
Maital and Marc H. Bornstein, The Ecology of Collaborative Child Rearing: A Systems 
Approach to Child Care on the Kibbutz, 31 Ethos 274, 277 (2003). 
 65 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 557 (cited in note 59). 
 66 See id. See also Bobbie Turniansky and Julie Cwikel, Volunteering in a Volun-
tary Community: Kibbutz Members and Voluntarism, 7 Voluntas 300, 302 (1996). 
 67 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 559 (cited in note 59).  
 68 Richard Edwards, Kibbutz Movement, in Spencer C. Tucker, ed, The Encyclope-
dia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social, and Military History 581, 582 (ABC-
CLIO 2008). 
 69 See Daniel Gavron, The Kibbutz: Awakening from Utopia 6 (Rowman & Little-
field 2000). 
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In the 1980s, changes in Israeli society began to be felt in 
the kibbutz. Parents were no longer willing to allow their chil-
dren to be raised collectively; as a result kibbutzim permitted 
parents to raise their children in their own residential units 
within the kibbutz.70 Even so, kibbutzim came under pressure 
from the younger generation. Grown children would depart the 
kibbutz for studies or travel, never to return.71 Meanwhile, those 
who remained in the kibbutz would often be attracted to em-
ployment opportunities outside the kibbutz. Such members 
would either be frustrated at the duties they had to perform in 
the kibbutz or find themselves shirking kibbutz duties in favor 
of outside employment.72 Some aging members found their ideo-
logical preferences changing against communal living, and while 
they wished to continue to live on the kibbutz, they no longer 
shared its collectivist ideals.73 Many of these changes were re-
flective of larger changes in Israeli society away from a centrally 
controlled economy toward free enterprise.74 
Not coincidentally, during the 1980s, the kibbutzim experi-
enced a severe financial crisis, leading most kibbutzim to the 
verge of bankruptcy.75 The financial crisis of the kibbutzim in 
the 1980s was partially attributed to labor problems—both 
shortages and misallocations of the existing laborers—and par-
tially to other financial mismanagement.76 Ultimately, the kib-
butzim were saved by a government bailout. The state forced 
creditor banks to forgive some outstanding loans while others’ 
debts were directly paid by the state. Kibbutzim were forced to 
relinquish some assets, including substantial land holdings.77 
 
 70 See Michal Palgi and Shulamit Reinharz, Introduction, in Michal Palgi and Shu-
lamit Reinharz, eds, One Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Rein-
vention 1, 8 (Transaction 2011).  
 71 See Gavron, The Kibbutz at 6 (cited in note 69). 
 72 See Raymond Russell, Utopia in Zion: The Israeli Experience with Worker Coop-
eratives 169 (SUNY 1995). 
 73 See Stephen Charles Mott, The Kibbutz’s Adjustment to Industrialization and 
Ideological Decline: Alternatives for Economic Organization, 19 J Religious Ethics 151, 
156–57 (1991). 
 74 See Simons and Ingram, 48 Admin Sci Q at 595 (cited in note 63). 
 75 See id at 614. 
 76 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 559 (cited in note 59) (attributing the “crisis in the 
kibbutz” to massive debt resulting from losses in the stock market, “inability to repay 
excessive bank loans, and a 400 percent inflation in the Israeli economy”); Yuval Dror, 
‘National Education’ through Mutually Supportive Devices: A Case Study of Zionist Edu-
cation 292 (Peter Lang 2007). 
 77 See Jo-Ann Mort and Gary Brenner, Our Hearts Invented a Place: Can Kibbutzim 
Survive in Today’s Israel? 28 (Cornell 2003) (noting an arrangement by which kibbutzim 
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Lacking a sufficiently large labor force to sustain the kib-
butzim, and given their financial difficulties, the kibbutzim 
started to diversify their economies and bring in temporary em-
ployees to fill their labor needs.78 Gradually, the kibbutzim be-
gan a process of “privatization,” in which membership in the 
kibbutz no longer entailed a complete relinquishment of private 
property or a thoroughly communal life. Members of the kibbutz 
were granted private property rights over their homes and other 
assets. Members today make their own employment arrange-
ments and simply pay fees for kibbutz services.79 Kibbutz mem-
bers receive payment for their work on the kibbutz, and such 
payments reflect the differing skill levels and demands of the 
employment tasks. Kibbutz-owned enterprises (not only agricul-
tural businesses but also other kibbutz-owned ventures, such as 
small manufacturing plants) were also “privatized.” While the 
kibbutz continues to own the businesses, their management has 
been professionalized, and the membership at large can no long-
er make operational and other business decisions.80 In one par-
ticularly striking example, Kibbutz Shamir’s corporation, Sha-
mir Optical Industry, is listed on NASDAQ. These changes have 
been adopted at different paces in different kibbutzim, but the 
overall trajectory is clear.81 
Today, privatization is almost complete in the kibbutzim. In 
nearly all kibbutzim, while the kibbutz retains formal title over 
realty in the kibbutz, members have recognized protected rights 
to individual units.82 Kibbutz members no longer yield all out-
side property rights to the collective, and members therefore 
own pieces of realty outside the kibbutzim. Kibbutz members 
can and do use their personal assets to acquire chattel and real-
ty to which they then hold sole title.83 
 
relinquished up to 40 percent of their agricultural land to relieve their debts); Uriel Levi-
atan, Jack Quarter, and Hugh Oliver, Introduction: The Kibbutz in Crisis, in Uriel Levi-
atan, Hugh Oliver, and Jack Quarter, eds, Crisis in the Israeli Kibbutz: Meeting the 
Challenge of Changing Times vii, xv (Praeger 1998). 
 78 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 562 (cited in note 59). 
 79 See id at 561.  
 80 See Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Crisis and Transformation: The Kibbutz at Century’s 
End 109–10 (SUNY 1997). 
 81 See Ayala Cnaan, Holy Land of Aliens: Formal Governance Mechanisms in Israe-
li Alternative Communities *69–73 (unpublished PhD dissertation, Rensselaer Polytech-
nic Institute, 2007) (on file at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute). 
 82 See Spiro, 106 Am Anthro at 561 (cited in note 59).  
 83 See id. 
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Kibbutzim are recognized legal entities under the Coopera-
tive Societies Ordinance, 1933.84 As cooperative societies, kib-
butzim benefit from favorable tax treatment, as well as other 
specialized rules related to its status as a separate legal person-
ality.85 Ultimately, this means that, as far as the state is con-
cerned, kibbutzim own property rights that are similar to those 
owned by any other legal person in the state. However, within 
the kibbutz, the rights of members are established by the inter-
nal rules of the kibbutz, either by the governing documents or by 
ongoing decisions of the collective.86 Consequently, member 
property rights are only enforceable outside the kibbutz to the 
extent permitted by internal kibbutz rules, and as contractual 
rights only.87 
3.  Sámi. 
The Sámi (or Saami) are a people indigenous to the Arctic 
circle in an area called Sápmi—northern Scandinavia (Norway, 
Sweden and northern Finland) as well as the Kola Peninsula in 
Russia.88 In the past, the Sámi were often referred to as “Lapps” 
or “Laplanders” and their region “Lapland,” but these latter 
terms have fallen out of usage and are now considered pejora-
tive.89 Physical remnants of Sámi inhabitation of the Sápmi area 
have been found from as far back as 10,000 BC.90 
The four states over which Sápmi territory is now spread 
extended their sovereignty into the area relatively recently. The 
 
 84 1 The Laws of Palestine in Force on the 31st Day of December, 1933 360 (Water-
low and Sons 1934) (Robert Harry Drayton, ed). See also James Horrox, City Communes 
in Israel: Prolegomena to a Morphology of Urban Communalism, 31 Communal Societies 
21, 33 (2011).  
 85 See, for example, Joshua Muravchik, Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of So-
cialism 327 (Encounter 2002). See also Gavron, The Kibbutz at 220 (cited in note 69). 
 86 See T.M.S. Evens, Two Kinds of Rationality: Kibbutz Democracy and Genera-
tional Conflict 40–42 (Minnesota 1995). 
 87 See Daniel Gavron, Intentional Communities in Israel—Current Movement, in 
Karen Christensen and David Levinson, eds, 2 Encyclopedia of Community: From the 
Village to the Virtual World 727, 728 (Sage 2003). 
 88 See Torbjörn Josefsson, Ingela Bergman, and Lars Östland, Quantifying Sami 
Settlement and Movement Patterns in Northern Sweden 1700–1900, 63 Arctic 141, 142 
(2010). 
 89 See Barbara Helen Miller, Connecting and Correcting: A Case Study of Sami 
Healers in Porsanger 1 (CNWS 2007).  
 90 See Valerie Alia, The New Media Nation: Indigenous Peoples and Global Com-
munication 63 (Berghahn 2010). 
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area of Sápmi incorporated into Norway is called Finnmark.91 
While Norway traces its statehood to 872, Finnmark only grad-
ually became part of Norway starting in 1613 (the coastal areas) 
and finishing in 1826, with the establishment of a border with 
Russia.92 Obviously, Sámi were living in and using the land long 
before Norway extended its sovereignty into the area. 
A 1775 distribution of land by the state is considered the 
root of title in the Finnmark area of Norway.93 Large areas were 
excluded from this process of distributing private title and were 
reserved as state land. Starting in 1863, Norway established 
strict guidelines for transferring state land to private purchas-
ers.94 While Sámi were eventually permitted to purchase land, 
this was often conditioned on “Norwegianization,” that is, adop-
tion of a Norwegian name and demonstration of facility in the 
Norwegian language.95 While some Sámi assimilated and ac-
quired land, others refused to do so and found their customary 
landholdings were owned by the state.96 
Outside the formal Norwegian system, the Sámi have had 
longstanding customary reindeer pasture rights. These custom-
ary rights include defined fishing areas, hunting grounds, gath-
ering places, trapping lines, and specific reindeer pastures. 
Boundaries were historically set by tradition and memorialized 
verbally.97 These customary rights were considered outside the 
chain of title in Norway, and thus had no legal expression. 
The past three decades have seen a change in attitudes to-
ward Sámi land claims. The Norwegianization policy has been 
 
 91 Garth Nettheim, Gary D. Meyers, and Donna Craig, Indigenous Peoples and 
Governance Structures: A Comparative Analysis of Land and Resource Management 
Rights 210 (Aboriginal Studies 2002). 
 92 Id.  
 93 See Øyvind Ravna, Recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights through Modern 
Legislation. The Case of the Sami People in Norway, in Mona Elisabeth Brøther and Jon-
Andreas Solberg, eds, 2 Legal Empowerment—A Way out of Poverty 65, 67 (Norwegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006).  
 94 See Sally Jeanrenaud, Communities and Forest Management in Western Europe: 
A Regional Profile of the Working Group on Community Involvement in Forest Manage-
ment 20 (IUCN 2001); G. Tandberg, Agriculture, in Sten Konow and Karl Fischer, eds, 
Norway: Official Publication for the Paris Exhibition 1900 307, 310 (Kristiania 1900). 
 95 See Monika Žagar, Knut Hamsun: The Dark Side of Literary Brilliance 165 
(Washington 2009). 
 96 See id at 164–66. See also Christian Momberger, Arctic Regions, the Sámi and 
Global Climate Change Debate: Collection of Essays and Papers Written 2001/2002 with-
in the Arctic Studies Program 19–20 (GRIN Verlag 2002). 
 97 See Tom Svensson, The Attainment of Limited Self-Determination among the 
Sami in Recent Years, in René Kuppe and Richard Potz, eds, 8 Law and Anthropology 
267, 272 (Martinus Nijhoff 1996). 
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abandoned, and some powers have been devolved to a repre-
sentative Sámi body.98 As well, ownership over state lands has 
been transferred to a new governmental body that is expected to 
cooperate better with Sámi needs.99 These changes have been 
driven both by changing perceptions of the justice of Sámi claims 
and the belief that some changes were required by changing in-
ternational norms to which Norway had subjected itself.100 
The most important of these changes has resulted in Nor-
way creating public easements over lands in Finnmark (both 
publicly and privately owned) for the benefit of Sámi. Reindeer 
pasture area is reserved for Sámi reindeer herding; Sámi also 
have herding rights in “concession areas,” but those rights are 
shared with other Norwegians.101 The Reindeer Herding Act of 
1978102 reserves Sámi herding rights to those of a Sámi family, 
though the familial connection is not precisely defined.103 Addi-
tionally, to enjoy the Sámi herding rights, the claimant must 
have had a parent or grandparent whose main occupation was 
reindeer herding.104 The herding rights are formalized in opera-
tional permits, which may be passed inter vivos or upon death to 
close family relations.105 Herding rights include not only reindeer 
grazing but also the right to dwell on the land, build necessary 
structures, trap and fish, gather wood, and other uses of the 
land.106 
The resulting property system is a curious blend of state law 
and local Sámi customs. Formal property rights depend upon 
the state titling system and usage rights created under state 
 
 98 See Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights under International Law: 
From Victims to Actors 236 (Transnational 2006).  
 99 See id at 237. 
 100 See id.  
 101 See E. Carina H. Keskitalo, Climate Change and Globalization in the Arctic: An 
Integrated Approach to Vulnerability Assessment 99 (Earthscan 2008).  
 102 See Lov 9 June 1978 nr 49 om reindrift (Reindeer Herding Act of June 9, 1978 no 
49), repealed by Lov 15 June 2007 nr 40 om reindrift (Reindeer Herding Act of June 15, 
2007 no 40).  
 103 See Margaret Anne Stephenson, Sámi Lands and Indigenous Australian Lands: 
Some Comparative Perspectives, in Günter Minnerup and Pia Solberg, eds, First World, 
First Nations: Internal Colonialism and Indigenous Self-Determination in Northern Eu-
rope and Australia 168, 175 (Sussex Academic 2011). 
 104 See id.  
 105 See Lov 9 June 1978 nr 49 om reindrift § 4 (Reindeer Herding Act of June 9, 
1978 no 49 § 4). See also Elisabeth Einarsbøl, Reindeer Husbandry Rights in Norway 
(Gáldu: Resource Centre for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2005), online at 
http://www.galdu.org/web/index.php?artihkkal=259&giella1=eng (visited May 9, 2013).  
 106 See Stephenson, Sámi Lands and Indigenous Australian Lands at 174–75 (cited 
in note 103). 
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law. However, state law carves out ethnically limited property 
rights for Sámi, facilitating the preservation (or creation) of lo-
calized property rules within Sámi communities. Additionally, 
the formal rights are ethnically bound, creating a localized prop-
erty system partially divorced from the wider property law with-
in the jurisdiction. 
B.  “Unofficial” Localized Property Regimes 
1.  Favelas. 
In sharp contrast to kibbutzim, favelas in Brazil were not 
conscious creations in expression of a romantic ideology. Favela 
is a Portuguese term for slum, and favelas are generally de-
scribed as “shanty towns.”107 The favelas were created primarily 
during the twentieth century as a result of rural emigration to 
the cities.108 Favela dwellers were traditionally squatters. That 
is, favela dwellers had no formally recognized legal rights to the 
land on which they lived; rather, they generally took up resi-
dence on either private or public lands.109 In other cases, the fa-
vela residents did not trespass on private or public landholdings, 
but they still failed to acquire formal property rights. For in-
stance, in many cases, favelas arose after the “purchase” of ir-
regular lots of land, whose demarcation could not be recognized 
under existing law.110 In such cases, the seller wished to sell land 
and the buyer wished to buy, but state law would not recognize 
the sale because the lot size did not fit within titling rules. 
Whether arising due to squatting or unlawful subdivision of 
land, favelas developed socially respected property norms not-
withstanding the lack of formal property rights. The favelas rec-
ognized dwellers’ informal property rights to their homes, as 
well as the authority of complex community institutions.111 
Favelas date back to a settlement on a hill in Rio de Janeiro 
called Morro da Providência, founded by soldiers returning from 
 
 107 See Crawford, 80 Fordham L Rev at 1105 (cited in note 3).  
 108 Martin Mowforth, Clive Charlton, and Ian Munt, Tourism and Responsibility: 
Perspectives from Latin America and the Caribbean 186 (Routledge 2008). 
 109 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62 (cited in note 3).  
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a civil war (Guerra de Canudos, 1895–96).112 The soldiers had 
not yet been paid, and they did not purchase the land on which 
they built their new settlement, Morro da Favela. Subsequent 
urban squatting settlements earned the name “favela” in imita-
tion of the soldiers’ community, both for the practice of squatting 
and for the low quality of land and housing.113 As the urban set-
tlements became more popular, the term gained formal ac-
ceptance, even being used as a category in the Brazilian census 
in 1950.114 Favelas grew explosively from the 1940s to the 1970s 
due to increasing urbanization.115 Today, Rio de Janeiro is home 
to hundreds of favelas, and approximately 14.4 percent of its 
residents live in favelas and other “subnormal agglomerates.”116  
Favelas continue to grow at a faster pace than the population of 
the city as a whole.117 
Strikingly, many favelas in Rio de Janeiro are located on 
hillsides, giving favelas scenic views—particularly when com-
pared to the obstructed views of more affluent housing in the 
valleys below—but also exposing them to soil erosion, mudslides, 
and collapse.118 Favelas are better known for their high crime 
rates and substandard living conditions.119 While favelas are 
complete communities, with local businesses such as groceries, 
they have limited access to basic utility services such as plumb-
ing or electricity. In most favelas, sewage runs through the 
 
 112 Adrian Parr, Hijacking Sustainability 128 (MIT 2009); Greg O’Hare and Michael 
Barke, The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial Analysis, 56 GeoJournal 
225, 232 (2002) (stating that Morro da Providência was established in 1898 by soldiers 
returning to Rio de Janeiro from war who were unable to afford shelter); Janice E. Perl-
man, The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro 13 (Califor-
nia 1976).  
 113 Monique M. Vallance, Favelas, in John J. Crocitti and Monique M. Vallance, eds, 
1 Brazil Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Republic 253, 253 (ABC-CLIO 2012). See 
Lloyd-Sherlock, 16 Bull Latin Am Rsrch at 290 (cited in note 111). 
 114 See Fred B. Morris and Gerald F. Pyle, The Social Environment of Rio de Janeiro 
in 1960, 47 Econ Geography 286, 288 (1971). 
 115 Perlman, The Myth of Marginality at 5 (cited in note 112). 
 116 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, 2010 Census: 11.4 Million Brazilians 
(6.0%) Live in Subnormal Agglomerates (Dec 21, 2011), online at http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/ 
presidencia/noticias/noticia_impressao.php?id_noticia=2057 (visited May 9, 2013).  
 117 Janice E. Perlman, Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of Rio de 
Janeiro, 1969–2002, in Ananya Roy and Nezar AlSayyad, eds, Urban Informality: 
Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America, and South Asia 104, 
108 (Lexington 2004). 
 118 O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 229 (cited in note 112) (“In Rio (as in Salva-
dor) many favela sites on hillsides close to the city centre . . . are unsuitable for commer-
cial development and therefore have not been cleared wholesale by the city authorities.”).   
 119 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62–63 (cited in note 3). 
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streets.120 The 1950 census criteria defined favelas not only by 
the absence of legal title but also by low quality housing and in 
the absence of paved streets and public services such as plumb-
ing, sanitation, water, electricity, and telephone.121 
Over the years, favelas have been subject to numerous re-
form efforts. Controversial “slum clearance” projects, particular-
ly in the 1970s, aimed at reclaiming the land for its private and 
public owners.122 These projects, in some cases accompanied by 
efforts to provide public housing for the slum dwellers, are wide-
ly viewed as failures.123 In some cases, after an area was cleared, 
new favelas grew up on the site of the old ones.124 In many cases, 
expelled favela dwellers soon found themselves living in differ-
ent favelas.125 Simply put, the demand for the favela-style hous-
ing remained high while the supply in the formal market re-
mained low, leading consumers to the low-cost alternative of 
squatting in a new location. Other reform efforts have focused 
on arrangements for legalizing land tenure for dwellers while 
upgrading the physical quality of neighborhoods.126 In recent 
years, both strategies have been tried by various municipalities 
in Brazil.127 To date, progress has been limited.128 Favelas con-
tinue to grow.129 
The reason for favelas’ continued popularity remains a mat-
ter of controversy. Evidently favelas provide migrants to the large 
cities with goods that are not available in the formal housing 
 
 120 Id at 71. 
 121 Morris and Pyle, 47 Econ Geography at 288 (cited in note 114).  
 122 O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 234 (cited in note 112):  
With the help of funds from the US Alliance for Progress programme, between 
1962 and 1974, 80 squatter settlements were compulsorily (sometimes violent-
ly) removed. . . . These processes gained in intensity after the 1964 military 
coup when squatter areas adjacent to upper-income neighbourhoods and areas 
scheduled for industrial development began to be eradicated. 
 123 See, for example, O’Hare, 86 Geography at 63 (cited in note 3). 
 124 Marshall C. Eakin, Brazil: The Once and Future Country 107 (St Martin’s 1997) 
(“City planners tried to raze the favelas and relocate the poor in government housing, 
which was often miles from the inner city. By the 1970s, it had become clear that this 
process was not working and that the tidal wave of poor migrants had overwhelmed any 
pretense of relocation.”).   
 125 Vanessa N. Francis, Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Urban Housing Ini-
tiatives in South America: Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paolo *31–32 (unpublished 
MRCP thesis, Morgan State University, 2007) (on file at Morgan State University).  
 126 See O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 238 (cited in note 112) (describing a re-
form program whereby favelados are given title to their homes). 
 127 See id; Francis, Comparative Analysis at *56–61 (cited in note 125). 
 128 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 62, 73 (cited in note 3).  
 129 Consider O’Hare and Barke, 56 GeoJournal at 238 (cited in note 112).  
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market: cheap, conveniently located housing, even if of inferior 
quality and provided with inferior services. The reason for the 
lack of affordable housing might be excessive regulation of the 
quality and pricing of housing in the formal market.130 
2.  Other “unofficial” localized property regimes. 
Although we have chosen to focus on a small number of 
large-scale localized property regimes, readers should be aware 
that there are many other examples of localized property re-
gimes that affect our lives. Two of the best known regimes that 
have been the subject of academic study include the norms of 
cattle trespass in Shasta County, as described in Professor Rob-
ert Ellickson’s classic Order without Law131 and Professor Erving 
Goffman’s account of property arrangements in mental asylums.132 
Professor Ellickson’s famous book Order without Law con-
tains, among other features, a fascinating account of the alloca-
tion of grazing grounds in Shasta County, California. Tellingly, 
Professor Ellickson discovered that the formal legal classifica-
tion of land as either open or closed to free grazing is highly ir-
relevant in Shasta County, as it was largely replaced by a set of 
local norms and understandings that are modeled on principles 
of good “neighborliness.”133 
Professor Goffman’s account of property arrangements in 
mental asylums is one of the most moving property stories one 
can find. Professor Goffman reports that upon checking into an 
asylum, patients are stripped of all their personal belongings. 
Thereafter, they embark upon a long journey of property collec-
tion. Professor Goffman discusses in great detail the process by 
which different items are appropriated and stored. But, perhaps, 
the most interesting aspect of this property regime is that the 
staff largely respects the norms that arise among patients and 
under most circumstances cooperate with them.134 
 
 130 O’Hare, 86 Geography at 65–66 (cited in note 3). See also Maria Teresa Xavier 
Souza, The Effect of Land Use Regulation on Housing Price and Informality: A Model 
Applied to Curitiba, Brazil *11–12 (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Mary-
land–College Park, 2009), online at http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/9290/1/ 
Souza_umd_0117E_10314.pdf (visited May 9, 2013).  
 131 Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard 
1991). 
 132 Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and 
Other Inmates 227–54 (Aldine 1961).  
 133 Ellickson, Order without Law at 40–64 (cited in note 131).  
 134 Goffman, Asylums at 244–54 (cited in note 132). 
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Other localized property regimes have not won such careful 
academic attention. Localized property arrangements are ubiq-
uitous in urban life, but few have been examined systematically. 
As we noted, Professor Epstein famously researched the local-
ized property regime covering parking places on public streets,135 
but there are many other localized regimes to consider. Think, 
for example, of the rules that govern using playground facilities 
or ball fields. Some areas have formal rules requiring users to 
sign up for use in fixed time slots. Disputes often arise when us-
ers deviate from the expected time limits. Other areas allow al-
location of the space but on a more informal basis. Persons may 
arrive early and “stake a claim” on the space until other users 
arrive. In yet other settings, there is no real principle of organi-
zation, and a combination of deference, aggressiveness, and pri-
ority in time govern. For examples of this last phenomenon, 
think of seating in subways or parking in shopping malls. 
Localized property regimes also govern the allocation of 
space in public squares to street performers. Different cities 
have adopted different priority rules to determine how space on 
sidewalks, parks, and plazas is to be allocated among street per-
formers. Some cities have registration systems that allow street 
performers to establish temporal priority.136 In others, no ad-
vance registration is possible and priority is established by first 
occupancy.137 In yet other cities the allocation may be based on 
seniority.138 Whatever the norm is, new artists who wish to per-
form must comply with it, even though they did not partake in 
the decision to adopt it.  
Yet another localized property system strikes even closer to 
home—at least as far as the authors are concerned—as it gov-
erns the allocation of office space to law school faculty.139 This 
example is particularly interesting as it involves an informal 
property allocation among individuals who are trained in formal 
 
 135 Epstein, 31 J Legal Stud at S521–43 (cited in note 21). 
 136 See, for example, David Grazian, Blue Chicago: The Search for Authenticity in 
Urban Blues Clubs 225 (Chicago 2003) (discussing registration procedures for street perform-
ers in Chicago); NYC Code § 10-108; Street Performances in New York, 411 New York (July 
16, 2007), online at http://411newyork.org/guide/2007/07/16/street-performances-in-new-york 
(visited May 9, 2013). 
 137 See, for example, Aram Parrish Lief, Musicians Who Busk: Identity, Career, and 
Community in New Orleans Street Performance *59 (unpublished MS thesis, University of 
New Orleans, 2008), online at http://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=1683&context=td (visited May 9, 2013). 
 138 See, for example, id at *57.   
 139 See generally Roderick A. Macdonald, Office Politics, 40 U Toronto L J 419 (1990).  
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law, yet it gives rise to very few disputes (although it is not im-
possible that it generates discontent). Interestingly, there is var-
iance among schools both with respect to allocation rules and 
termination rules. In some schools, office space is allocated 
based on seniority. However, the definition of seniority may dif-
fer from school to school. In some schools, seniority is calculated 
based on the year of one’s first law degree. In other schools, sen-
iority may be based on one’s tenure in the institution—that is, 
the date on which the member joined the faculty. Still in other 
institutions, office space may be allocated based on merit as 
measured by scholarly productivity or teaching success. As for 
termination, in almost all schools (as far as we know) once an of-
fice space has been allocated to a member it is hers until retire-
ment, unless she voluntarily decides to relinquish her rights to 
the space. Yet, in a very small minority of schools, decline in per-
formance may cost one one’s office space. 
C.  The Attractions of Localized Property Systems 
Why do localized property systems arise? 
Simply put, communities or groups of individuals may need 
or want acceptable arrangements for allocating entitlements to 
assets that do not match the statewide arrangements. We offer 
four reasons why such localized property rights might arise, alt-
hough we do not claim that the list is comprehensive. Addition-
ally, we observe that in many cases, more than one reason may 
apply. 
First, the formal property system may be too rigid, or re-
strictive, for certain individuals. They may desire more flexible, 
or adaptable, arrangements. Consider the case of family mem-
bers living in the same household, or of roommates. Given their 
ongoing relationships, family members or roommates may find 
the costs of negotiating rights for any individual item to be rela-
tively low. They may therefore prefer to avoid the strictures of 
the formal legal system and opt, instead, into a less formal sys-
tem of norms and property arrangements. Indeed, they may con-
sider the reliance on state-ordered property rights to undermine 
the network of negotiated arrangements governing the house-
hold. Stated otherwise, in many situations of ongoing relation-
ships, the transaction costs of the informal system will be lower 
than the transaction costs entailed in formal definition of rights 
through the legal system. 
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Second, the formal legal system may adopt a property re-
gime that is inherently inconsistent with the needs of the group. 
In particular, this may happen when the ideology of a certain 
group rejects the standard allocation and definition of private 
property rights. This is what happened in the case of the kibbut-
zim in Israel. The state adopted a system of private property 
rights that was typical for Western states while the kibbutzim 
were founded on the basis of a radical collectivist ideology that 
rejected any private property.140 In economic terms, we might 
say that the local property regime gives its participants psycho-
logical and ideological utility that adequately compensates for 
the loss of utility entailed in having property rights that are un-
recognized in the statewide property system. 
Third, the closed list (numerus clausus) of property rights 
may simply not contain certain property options desired by 
members of various groups. After all, the enumeration of proper-
ty rights is finite, which means that certain arrangements will 
not be included in it.141 This reason perhaps best explains the 
rules that govern various common interest communities, such as 
subdivisions with condominium ownership.142 Property law has 
traditionally provided a very small list of rules for common own-
ers and for neighbors. Persons buying condominium units will 
want to govern many other items left out of the default standard 
property rules. While condominiums can anchor some of their 
rules in standard property instruments, such as covenants, they 
may also find it advantageous to leave other rules to manage-
ment from time to time. Property forms, in other words, may 
prove to have positive utility in local settings, even though the 
law may not recognize their utility across society. 
Fourth, and finally, satellite rules that attend the property 
system may lead groups to avoid the property system in order to 
avoid the satellite rules. The clearest example of this is the sys-
tem of satellite land use laws that circumscribe property rights 
 
 140 See Part I.A.2. 
 141 For a discussion of the numerus clausus rule in property law, see Thomas W. 
Merrill and Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Nu-
merus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L J 1, 9–42 (2000); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardiza-
tion and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 Vand L Rev 1597, 1636–55 (2008); Henry Hans-
mann and Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus 
Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J Legal Stud S373, S382–85 (2002). 
 142 For a discussion of the property forms used by condominiums and other common-
interest communities, see Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 
Yale L J 1163, 1183–85 (1999). 
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over realty.143 While the legal system may offer a satisfactory 
menu of property choices in realty, would-be consumers may 
find that the ability to shape the property is so hampered by 
land use rules, construction regulations, or other limitations on 
owners’ ability to utilize their realty that the consumers will 
readily forego the benefits of state-recognized property owner-
ship in order to avoid the limitations.144 As the case of the fave-
las shows, this need not be a conscious choice. The licit market-
place for realty may be sufficiently restricted by the satellite 
limitations in land use that a large secondary market develops 
for realty ownership that is recognized only by the illicit local 
property system. 
II.   TRANSLATING LOCALIZED PROPERTY 
Our goal in this Part is to explore the interaction between 
localized property arrangements and the formal property sys-
tem. As we show, all localized property arrangements give rise 
to the challenge of translation—the process by which localized 
rights are incorporated into the state system. 
Although there are strong reasons for creating localized 
property regimes, these reasons do not eliminate the desire to 
use assets in interacting with the larger society. The need for 
translation arises whenever a person who possesses localized 
property rights seeks to make use of them outside the group or 
community in which they are recognized. To illustrate, consider 
a Native American individual who wishes to use her tribal prop-
erty as collateral for a loan from a commercial bank. Can she do 
it?145 A similar question arises when a member of the Sámi seeks 
to continue to use traditional pasture lands after they have been 
subjected to state ownership146 or when a kibbutz member  
 
 143 See id at 1173.  
 144 See Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scale of Property Pro-
tection, 107 Colum L Rev 883, 898–903 (2007).  
 145 See, for example, Marceau v Blackfeet Housing Authority, 540 F3d 916, 936 (9th 
Cir 2008) (explaining that Congress’s decision to hold tribal land in trust prevents Na-
tive Americans from using their land as security for loans). See also Matthew Atkinson, 
Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and People, 
23 Okla City U L Rev 379, 399 (1998) (“Indian land, which is held in ‘trust’ for them by 
the United States, cannot be used as collateral to obtain loans. This is but one obstacle to 
Indian private entrepreneurship or initiative.”). 
 146 For discussion, see Øyvind Ravna, The Process of Identifying Land Rights in 
Parts of Northern Norway: Does the Finnmark Act Prescribe an Adequate Procedure with-
in the National Law?, 3 Yearbook Polar L 423, 444–50 (2011). 
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decides to start a new life in the city and wishes to take several 
personal articles with her.147  
In this Part, we analyze the parameters that affect the de-
sirability of localized property arrangements and their value to 
their subjects. We demonstrate that in the world of property, the 
sustainability of localized property rights critically depends on 
their translatability. Lower translatability of property rights 
lessens the value of those rights, and conversely, greater trans-
latability increases the value of those rights. 
Consider, for example, the unregistered rights of the dwell-
ers in the favelas in Rio de Janeiro. These rights are not formal-
ly recognized by the Brazilian legal system and are only recog-
nized by fellow dwellers.148 Consequently, rights holders can 
transfer their rights only to other dwellers, but not to outsiders. 
A rights holder in a favela cannot borrow money from a bank on 
the security of her landholding, and she cannot sell her rights to 
someone outside the favela.149 These limitations on the proper-
ty’s use and transferability undermine the value of the property 
right and make the de facto rights of favela dwellers more lim-
ited than comparable rights that are recognized formally.150 In 
the case of kibbutz members, the result can be even more ex-
treme. In a notable Israeli case, the daughter of a deceased  
 
 147 In Rotem v Kibbutz Sdot Yam, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that beneficiar-
ies of a testamental gift of all the testatrix’s possessions could claim no rights in her 
house in the kibbutz because the kibbutz owned all rights in the realty, and the proce-
dure in which the kibbutz “allocated” the house to the testatrix merely granted her tem-
porary use rights. Rotem v Kibbutz Sdot Yam, CA 5747/08 ¶ 21 (2010), online at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/08/470/057/t04/08057470.t04.pdf (visited May 9, 2013). 
 148 See Michael Geiger Donovan, At the Doors of Legality: Planners, Favelados, and 
the Titling of Urban Brazil *322 (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Califor-
nia–Berkeley, 2007) (on file at University of California–Berkeley):  
With high registration costs, a distrust of government intervention, and in-
creasing segregation, there are signs that informal settlements are developing 
their own property registries independent of government authorities. . . . [In 
one informal settlement] [t]welve thousand homeowners have received this 
[unofficial] title for the equivalent of one dollar each although it has no official 
legal recognition.  
 149 See Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the 
West and Fails Everywhere Else 56 (Basic Books 2000): 
The lack of legal property thus explains why citizens in developing and former 
communist nations cannot make profitable contracts with strangers, cannot get 
credit, insurance, or utilities services: They have no property to lose. . . . And 
commitment is better understood when backed up by a pledge of property, 
whether it be a mortgage, a lien, or any other form of security that protects the 
other contracting party. 
 150 For an extensive examination of this phenomenon, see id at 39–67. 
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kibbutz member was left homeless because her late mother’s 
possessions all formally belonged to the kibbutz.151 
A.  The Costs of Translation 
Translation problems arise when persons with localized 
property rights to an asset desire to use the asset outside the lo-
cality in which the localized property rights are recognized. This 
desire may be created by the decision of the asset owner to leave 
the community. Alternatively, the owner may wish to remain in 
the community but wish only to remove the asset from it. Or, 
perhaps, the asset owner may seek to keep the asset physically 
within the community but to use the asset in some way outside 
the locality (for example, by mortgaging or otherwise using the 
asset as security for a loan). At any rate, the moment the asset 
is used outside the locality, the localized rights have to be trans-
lated into rights in the wider jurisdiction. 
As we will show presently, the ability to translate the local-
ized property rights into rights recognized by the wider jurisdic-
tion is extremely valuable. Translatable property rights are 
more readily transferred and used than localized rights, and it is 
easier to enjoy value (by use, transfer, exclusion, or otherwise) 
over broadly recognized property rights than narrowly recog-
nized ones. 
However, translation is not costless. Three kinds of costs 
generally accompany any translation of localized property 
rights. 
Perhaps the most obvious type of costs are information 
costs. Professor Henry Smith has written about such costs in the 
context of community customs,152 but such costs attend all local-
ized property systems. Information about the local rights,  
 
 151 Rotem, CA 5747/08 at ¶ 29. 
 152 Henry E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 Theoretical Inq L 5, 13–
15 (2009). Others have written extensively on custom, its development, and its potential 
place in legal ordering. See, for example, Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical 
Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U Chi L Rev 710, 713 
(1999); Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: Justice without the State 30–36 (Pacific 
Research 1990); Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Struc-
tural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U Pa L Rev 1643, 1647 
(1996); Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institu-
tions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne 
Fairs, 2 Econ & Polit 1, 2 (1990); Emily Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Mer-
chant, 90 Tex L Rev 1153, 1153–61 (2012). Insofar as the custom is understood as creat-
ing a parallel legal order for merchants in a certain line of business, it can be seen as a 
localized property system to which our analysis applies. 
 
2013] Property Lost in Translation 545 

ownership, and the asset must be transmitted to the larger ju-
risdiction. Acquiring expertise in these matters requires gather-
ing evidence and investing time. The more idiosyncratic the lo-
calized property system, the greater the informational costs will 
be in translating localized rights to the wider world. 
Second, and more importantly, owners will encounter in-
compatibility costs. Generally, the precise rights created by the 
localized property system are not recognized by the wider juris-
diction. Alternatively, they can be enforced only if described in 
imprecise terms (for example, enforcing kibbutz property rights 
only as contractual rights or as a partnership agreement).153 
Consequently, certain subtleties in the local property rights will 
be lost; to the degree that those subtleties accurately served lo-
cal needs, this may result in a loss to net welfare. The most ex-
treme case of incompatibility costs arises where there are open 
contradictions between the rights within the localized property 
system and those of the state system. For instance, while resi-
dents “own” land in favelas under the localized property system, 
in many cases that land already belongs to others under the 
state system.154 
Third, and finally, there are potential enforcement costs. 
Those rights that are compatible with the larger outside proper-
ty system must be enforced in that outside system. This cost 
may be large or small, depending on the comparable costs of en-
forcement within the localized system. There may even be cases 
where outside enforcement proves cheaper than enforcement 
within the localized property system. 
Both information costs and incompatibility costs grow as the 
similarity between the localized property rights and those of the 
wider jurisdiction’s property rights diminish. The more unfamil-
iar the local property rights, the greater the information costs 
will be in any translation. Likewise, the larger the gap between 
the localized property right and the rights recognized by the 
larger jurisdiction, the greater the likelihood of lost subtleties 
and the higher the incompatibility costs will be. 
 
 153 See Rotem, CA 5747/08 at ¶¶ 13–19 (rejecting a claimed property right in resi-
dence on grounds that members are restricted to contractual rights as expressed in the 
kibbutz regulations).  
 154 Licia Valladares, Popular Housing in Brazil: A Review, in Willem van Vliet, 
Elizabeth Huttman, and Sylvia Fava, eds, Housing Needs and Policy Approaches: Trends 
in Thirteen Countries 222, 225 (Duke 1985); Vicente del Rio, Favela, in Roger W. Caves, 
ed, Encyclopedia of the City 176, 176 (Routledge 2005); Souza, Effect of Land Use Regula-
tion at *12 (cited in note 130).  
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One way of describing the problem of translation is through 
the prism of transaction costs. In a world with perfect infor-
mation about rights, and infinitesimal costs of contracting, the 
gaps between localized property regimes and wider state proper-
ty systems would be irrelevant. Any person who wanted to es-
tablish her localized property rights in the wider property sys-
tem could costlessly let everyone know about the rights she 
wanted to protect and could contract costlessly with them to de-
fend her rights. 
As Professor R.H. Coase reminded us, however, we do not 
live in a world without transaction costs.155 In the real world, 
costs always attend transactions. Property rights in the Coasian 
world are the baselines from which negotiations are conducted, 
but where transaction costs are sufficiently high, parties will 
never depart from the baseline.156 In the locality within which 
the localized property regime prevails, local property is the base-
line. But outside the locality, the baseline is the prevalent 
statewide property regime. An owner of a localized property 
right who wishes to transact with others who do not recognize 
her right will have to face the costs of information, incompatibil-
ity, and enforcement. For instance, she will have to educate oth-
ers about the nature of her rights, their scope and their precise 
contours. The more idiosyncratic the localized rights are, the 
higher the cost of education. Of course, the holder of the local-
ized right will have to repeat the process with every new indi-
vidual with whom she wishes to transact. The more unfamiliar 
the right at issue is, the greater will be the expected number of 
interactions that the rights holder will have to go through to 
consummate a transaction. 
 
 155 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J L & Econ 1, 15 (1960):  
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is 
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on 
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the 
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely 
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would 
be carried out in a world in which the pricing system worked without cost.  
 156 Id at 15–16:  
Once the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is 
clear that such a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the in-
crease in the value of production consequent upon the rearrangement is great-
er than the costs which would be involved in bringing it about. 
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Even more troubling than the problem of education will be 
those of incompatibilities between legal forms and enforcement. 
Owners of localized property rights will have to convince persons 
outside the locality of the merits and value of the localized prop-
erty right. Outside the locality, only those who voluntarily sub-
ject themselves to the localized property regime can be held to it. 
This means that rights holders or potential rights holders will 
have to negotiate with a wide variety of potential parties for the 
rights to maintain the value of the localized property rights. 
Consider, for example, a localized property right in a house in a 
kibbutz. If the kibbutz member goes to a bank to get a loan se-
cured by a mortgage on the house, the bank’s reluctance to issue 
the loan will not be assuaged simply by an explanation of the 
nature of the kibbutz member’s rights in the house. The bank 
will also be concerned about its ability to realize gains from a 
foreclosure sale of the house in the event of default. While fellow 
kibbutz members will understand and value the rights in the 
house, few persons outside the kibbutz will. This means that the 
bank’s ability to recover funds from selling the house will rely on 
its ability to persuade potential buyers outside the kibbutz of the 
value of holding kibbutz-defined rights in the house. If, as is 
likely, prohibitive transaction costs prevent the bank from creat-
ing a large pool of potential buyers of the rights in the house, the 
bank will attach a small value to the mortgage. The security 
value of the house will have been largely lost in the attempt to 
translate the kibbutz-centered property rights to the outside 
world. 
In some cases, the contradictions between the rights recog-
nized within the localized property system and those between 
the state’s property system will make the challenge even great-
er. Where a favela homeowner seeks a mortgage, the favela resi-
dent has to face all the challenges of the kibbutz resident, plus 
an additional one. Sometimes, the favela resident’s localized 
property right relates to realty to which title already belongs to 
another party. As long as there is a nontrivial chance that the 
true owner’s title may be asserted in the future, banks and other 
potential creditors must discount the value of the localized prop-
erty interest.157 If the chances of a future assertion of title by the 
true owner are sufficiently high, the localized property right will 
be utterly unmarketable. 
 
 157 See, for example, De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 91 (cited in note 149).  
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Hence, from a transaction costs perspective localized proper-
ty arrangements can serve as lock-in devices that make it hard-
er for members of the relevant group to exit the group and move 
elsewhere. In that sense, they perform the same function as 
switching fees that are employed by cable and telephone compa-
nies to keep subscribers from switching to a different provider. 
In our case, however, the switching cost is not predetermined in 
advance by the provider as a price or penalty, but rather it is 
measured by the size of the incompatibility between the local-
ized arrangement and the formal property system. The greater 
the incompatibility, the greater the cost of switching. The exam-
ple of the kibbutz members in the early days of the movement 
provides the best illustration of this effect.158 
B.  Law and Network Effects 
Another theoretical framework for understanding the chal-
lenges presented by translation may be found in the literature 
on network effects and technological standards. 
Products and services that display network effects differ 
from other products and services in that their values tend to 
grow with the number of users.159 The classic example is teleph-
ony.160 A telephone apparatus is valueless for the first user as 
long as no one else has one. She cannot call anyone, nor can she 
receive calls. Once a second person purchases a phone, the 
phones have a modicum of value for both the subsequent pur-
chaser and the first user. The two users can now converse by 
telephone, although the phone remains useless outside the net-
work of two. As the number of telephone users grows, the value 
of the technology grows as well. Indeed, a telephone is most val-
uable when every person in the world has one (or several).161 
Prima facie, industries that are characterized by network ef-
fects maximize their value when technological standards are 
uniform. It is easy to see why. The adoption of a uniform stand-
ard potentially creates the greatest interoperability, and it 
 
 158 See Ran Abramitzky, The Limits of Equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz, 
123 Q J Econ 1111, 1151 (2008) (“This paper suggests . . . that lock-in devices are re-
quired to make exit costly.”).  
 159 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 94 (cited in note 11) (defining markets 
exhibiting “network effects” as ones where “the value of membership to one user is posi-
tively affected when another user joins and enlarges the network”). 
 160 See id (describing the telecommunications market as a classic example of a mar-
ket exhibiting “network effects”). 
 161 See id. 
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therefore maximizes value for users. Consequently, over time 
industries that display network effects often tend to converge on 
a single standard.162 Obviously, standardization comes at a cost. 
Standardization may thwart competition and stifle dynamic effi-
ciency.163 The converged-upon standard may not be the best 
technology. A technology’s initial market advantage (due to su-
perior advertising, for instance) may be enough to compensate 
for its technological inferiority.164 The adoption of a single pro-
prietary technology creates a barrier to entry for other firms and 
may yield a monopoly position for the standard’s provider.165 
A commonly cited example is the technological standard 
created in the 1990s personal computer market by IBM and Mi-
crosoft.166 When IBM entered the PC market in 1981, it was one 
of several personal computer manufacturers, along with Apple, 
Commodore, Atari, and Tandy.167 Each of the personal comput-
ers used different software for its operating system; IBM adopt-
ed Microsoft’s MS-DOS for its machines.168 As the IBM PC 
standard became more popular, Microsoft’s operating systems 
(MS-DOS and successor operating systems) became increasingly 
important, until they eventually became the dominant operating 
 
 162 See id at 105 (“In markets with network effects, there is natural tendency toward 
de facto standardization, which means everyone using the same system.”). 
 163 Consider Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 105–08 (cited in note 11) (noting 
that while network effects tend to favor standardization, product differentiation and con-
sumer heterogeneity may result in multiple products coexisting in a market exhibiting 
network effects). 
 164 See id at 107 (observing that a “small, initial advantage” by a competitor in a 
market with network effects may be enough “to parlay its advantage into a larger, last-
ing one”); Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 122 (cited in note 10). 
 165 See Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 108 (cited in note 11) (stating that some 
models demonstrate that “users tend to stick with an established technology even when 
total surplus would be greater were they to adopt a new but incompatible technology”); 
Besen and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 122 (cited in note 10) (explaining that because 
markets exhibiting network effects display inertia, “it is difficult for it to be displaced 
even by a technically superior and cheaper alternative”).  
 166 See John E. Lopatka and William H. Page, Antitrust on Internet Time: Microsoft 
and the Law and Economics of Exclusion, 7 S Ct Econ Rev 157, 188 (1999); Gregory J. 
Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from the Microsoft Case, 69 
Antitrust L J 87, 88 (2001); Richard J. Gilbert and Michael L. Katz, An Economist’s 
Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft, 15 J Econ Persp 25, 28–29 (Spring 2001). 
 167 See Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not Only Microsoft: The Maturing of the Personal 
Computer Software Industry, 1982–1995, 75 Bus Hist Rev 103, 110–13 (2001). 
 168 Id at 112–14. Although IBM machines were eventually sold with non-Microsoft 
operating systems, the needs of software compatibility through several generations of 
hardware dictated that IBM systems and those with similar and compatible hardware 
architecture (IBM-compatibles) continue to use Microsoft software, through several gen-
erations of MS-DOS and later Microsoft Windows. See id at 127–28.  
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systems for personal computers. Consequently, it became more 
profitable for software companies to tailor their software (such 
as games, word processors, etc.) for Microsoft’s operating sys-
tems.169 This, in turn, made Microsoft’s operating systems more 
valuable to consumers, and increased Microsoft’s share of the 
operating system market. The more popular the operating sys-
tem, the more software it gathered, and the more software it 
gathered, the more popular the operating system became.170 
The economic and legal literature on the subject suggests 
two possible solutions to the problem of monopolization: open 
standards171 and interoperability.172 Essentially, both solutions 
are the same. The core idea is to preserve the network effects 
without sacrificing competition. The first solution advocates 
forcing the adoption of standards that will remain open to all in-
dustry participants, so that each of them will be able to compete 
over complementary technologies.173 The second solution does 
not require technological standards to be completely open and 
settles instead for requiring a design that will enable different 
technological standards to interact with each other.174 A well-
known example is the market for cellular communications. In 
this market, there are several service providers who operate  
 
 169 See Werden, 69 Antitrust L J at 93–94 (cited in note 166).  
 170 Steven D. Anderman, The Competition Law/IP ‘Interface’: An Introductory Note, 
in Steven D. Anderman, ed, The Interface between Intellectual Property Rights and Com-
petition Policy 1, 11 (Cambridge 2007). It must be noted that all this occurred while sev-
eral competing operating systems—such as Apple’s Mac-OS, Next’s NeXTSTEP OS, and 
IBM’s OS/2—were judged by industry experts to be technologically superior. See Besen 
and Farrell, 8 J Econ Persp at 118 (cited in note 10) (“[T]he initial success of MS-DOS is 
usually attributed not to any technical superiority, but to the fact that it was supported 
by IBM.”); John Sheesley, 5 of the Best Desktop Operating Systems You Never Used, TechRe-
public (Mar 19, 2008), online at http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/classic-tech/5-of-the-best 
-desktop-operating-systems-you-never-used/107 (visited May 9, 2013). 
 171 See, for example, Katz and Shapiro, 8 J Econ Persp at 103 (cited in note 11) (de-
scribing, as an example of an “open” system, IBM’s decision to allow independent soft-
ware developers to write IBM-compatible software for the PC). 
 172 See, for example, Lemley and McGowan, 86 Cal L Rev at 516 (cited in note 10):  
One possible solution to the standardization problem is to make the competing 
standards interoperable. If people can switch back and forth between compet-
ing versions of what is essentially the same standard, perhaps society can cap-
ture the benefits of competition without wasteful duplication of effort and 
without stranding consumers who make the wrong choice. 
 173 See, for example, id at 486–87 (“[C]ertain market conditions, such as a credible 
market commitment to open standards and compatibility, may ameliorate otherwise 
negative consequences of network effects.”). 
 174 See id at 552. 
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different technologies, yet the end users of all providers can 
seamlessly communicate with each other. 
Laws are a code of human behavior that can act like codes of 
technological standards. The economic and social imperatives for 
law, therefore, are often the same.175 However, there are some 
important differences. As far as formal law is concerned, the 
state has monopoly power over the production of the code, espe-
cially in the field of property where the numerus clausus princi-
ple grants to the state exclusive power over the recognition of 
property rights.176 But the state cannot prevent private parties 
from creating their own private codes of conduct, and the nu-
merus clausus principle does not and cannot bar the creation of 
informal localized property regimes. Indeed, by using contract 
law, private parties can create legally enforceable localized 
property regimes that closely resemble property law.177 
Nonetheless, the network effects of legal standards yield 
very strong pressure toward standardization. State recognized 
property rights are rights in rem that avail against all persons 
under the state’s authority.178 Hence, formal property rights are 
akin to a technological standard that has been adopted by the 
entire population of the jurisdiction. Owners of state-recognized 
property rights can transact with relative ease with any other 
person in the jurisdiction. Similarly, they can call on the state’s 
protection of their rights against transgressions by others in the 
jurisdiction. Localized property rights, by contrast, avail only 
against the members of the group that recognizes them. In the 
extreme, the number of members can be one. Similar to a single 
telephone user, a single adopter of a property arrangement will 
receive no value from the unique property form she devised. In-
deed, it is meaningless to speak of a right that nobody else  
 
 175 See Posner, Law and Social Norms at 148–66.  
 176 See Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 3–4 (cited in note 141) (explaining that 
the number of property rights are fixed in both common law and civil law property sys-
tems). 
 177 See, for example, id at 5:  
A willing buyer and a willing seller can create an infinite variety of enforceable 
contracts for the exchange of recognized property rights, and can describe these 
property rights along a multitude of physical dimensions and prices. But common-
law courts will not enforce an agreement to create a new type of property right. 
See also id at 54–58 (considering and rejecting the argument that numerus clausus is 
irrelevant in today’s world where parties can contract in numerous ways to create “new 
forms of organizational ownership based on contract”). 
 178 Merrill and Smith, 101 Colum L Rev at 777 (cited in note 18) (“Property rights, 
on the other hand, are in rem—they bind ‘the rest of the world.’”).   
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recognizes and that avails against no one. As the number of 
community members increases, the potential value of their local-
ized property arrangements increases as well. However, unless a 
localized arrangement is formally endorsed by the state, it will 
never encompass the entire population. 
More generally, formal recognition of rights that is backed 
by state enforcement dramatically increases the value of the 
rights to their holders.179 Formally recognized rights are very 
similar to an official currency. The state imprimatur renders 
those rights more transferable (and consequently valuable) both 
by increasing the number of potential transferees and by reduc-
ing the transaction costs associated with their passage.180 But 
the advantages do not end there. The protection the state pro-
vides to formally recognized rights reduces protection costs for 
owners and, according to conventional wisdom, gives them an 
incentive to invest optimally in the development of their assets. 
De Soto estimated that in Peru alone the cost of localized prop-
erty arrangements that have not been recognized by the state 
adds up to the staggering amount of $74 billion in what he calls 
“dead capital.”181 Even though this figure is subject to debate,182 
there is no doubt that formal recognition of property rights 
yields substantial advantages. As de Soto observes, once proper-
ty rights are formally recognized by the state, they can be “capi-
talized.” They can be used as security for debt, increasing liquid-
ity. They can be more easily sold on the market, again 
increasing liquidity.183 
 
 179 Merrill and Smith, 110 Yale L J at 26–34 (cited in note 141) (explaining that 
formally recognized rights are more valuable because they do not bear the measurement 
costs of rights that are not state recognized, such as informing parties of the rights re-
sulting from such property regimes). 
 180 See, for example, Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks 
of Contracts, 81 Va L Rev 757, 764–65 (1995) (arguing that corporate law should be ana-
lyzed in terms of network externalities). But see Hansmann, 8 Am L & Econ Rev at 6–7 
(cited in note 12) (considering and rejecting the idea that corporate charter drafters rely 
upon Delaware default corporate law rules due to network efficiencies). 
 181 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 33 (cited in note 149) (“The value of extrale-
gally held rural and urban real estate in Peru amounts to some $74 billion.”). 
 182 See Christopher Woodruff, Book Review, Review of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capi-
tal, 39 J Econ Lit 1215, 1220–22 (2001); Jim Thomas, Book Review, Hernando de Soto, 
The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere 
Else, 34 J Latin Am Stud 189, 189–90 (2002); Kevin E. Davis, Book Review, The Rules of 
Capitalism, 22 Third World Q 675, 678 (2001). 
 183 De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 49–51 (cited in note 149) (“Legal property thus 
gave the West the tools to produce surplus value over and above its physical assets.”). 
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None of these advantages accrue to holders of localized 
property rights. 
C.  Translation and the State System of Property 
The state is under no obligation to accommodate localized 
property forms. Naturally, the state can voluntarily decide to 
design its property code in a way that will be friendly and wel-
coming to localized property arrangements. But there is no way 
to force it to do so. In short, the law is not an open standard; nor 
is there a way to force the state to make it “interoperable” with 
localized property regimes. The burden of achieving legal in-
teroperability lies squarely with the local communities or groups 
that opt out of the formal legal system and prefer to design their 
unique property arrangements. 
As we have seen, in some cases localized property systems 
are “official” and enjoy or rely on the state’s imprimatur.184 In 
other cases, the local property systems are “unofficial” and are 
unrecognized by or even in opposition to state law.185 
Where localized property systems are unofficial, translation 
costs will generally be significant. But even where state law rec-
ognizes localized property systems, translation costs may arise. 
The localized system, by virtue of its internal set of rules, does 
not automatically translate into alienable rights within the larg-
er system. Indeed, in some cases, the state imposes restrictions 
on alienability as part of its recognition of the local system. Such 
is the case, for instance, with respect to Sámi property rights.186 
All things being equal, state recognition should lower trans-
lation costs. Well-designed state incorporation of localized prop-
erty systems should not only lower the costs of informing outsid-
ers about the nature of the localized rights, it should also lower 
the costs of enforcing such rights. However, state recognition 
may also have an adverse impact. Badly designed state incorpo-
ration (as was the case with Native American rights) can in-
crease the incompatibility between localized and state systems 
without bringing offsetting benefits in enforceability or infor-
mation.187 Additionally, state recognition may ossify the localized 
system, stripping away its ability to respond to community 
 
 184 See Part I.A. 
 185 See Part I.B. 
 186 See text accompanying notes 102–06.  
 187 See text accompanying notes 32–54. 
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needs.188 This can lead to lower utility from the localized system 
over time. 
The dynamics leading to the state to recognize only some lo-
calized property systems are complex. 
Some of the localized arrangements are essentially compati-
ble with the general legal framework while others are not. As we 
have noted, the degree to which localized property rights are in-
compatible with those of the state constitutes one of the central 
costs of translation.189 These incompatibility costs are systemic 
as well as rights centered. The more a localized property right is 
incompatible with state rights, the greater will be the cost of 
translating it to the outside world. What is true of the individual 
right will also be true of the entire property system. The more 
incompatible a particular localized regime, the less likely it is to 
be recognized by the legal system. When the legal system refus-
es to recognize a particular localized arrangement, it means that 
the value of the arrangement is confined to the group and efforts 
to enforce the arrangement outside the group will be costly and 
often fail. 
Our analysis gives rise to an important implication. The at-
titude of the legal system is an important determinant of a local-
ized property regime’s sustainability or viability. As we noted, 
the state is free to determine its attitude towards localized prop-
erty regimes. It can adopt a welcoming attitude or a hostile atti-
tude. In this sense, the state is similarly situated to the proprie-
tor of a dominant technological standard who has to decide how 
to approach an alternative technological solution. 
A caveat is in order here. Our analysis does not imply that 
localized property regimes are necessarily inefficient for the 
groups or communities that adopt them, even where the entire 
regime is incompatible with the state property system.190 As we 
will explore in greater detail in the next Part,191 the benefits, in-
cluding ideological rents, that group members derive from 
 
 188 See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev at 884–86, 897–98 (cited in note 144). 
 189 See text accompanying notes 153–54. 
 190 Indeed, there is a debate in the literature about the optimal level at which prop-
erty law should be produced. In a recent article, Professor Christopher Serkin advanced 
a qualified argument for determining property protection at the local level (that is, by 
local government) as opposed to the state or national level. See Serkin, 107 Colum L Rev 
at 892–904 (cited in note 144). It should be noted that Professor Serkin’s analysis focuses 
primarily on takings and land use issues. In other words, it is concerned with protecting 
property against government transgressions.  
 191 See Part III. 
 
2013] Property Lost in Translation 555 

unique property arrangements may outweigh the cost. Localized 
property norms contribute to group cohesion and may be essen-
tial for the preservation of historical heritage.192 Hence from the 
internal point of view of the group members, opting out of the 
legal standard may be a prudent choice. 
At the same time, it must be borne in mind that neither the 
cost of localized property regimes nor the benefits remain con-
stant over time. The calculus is dynamic. Market value of re-
sources may change, making exit options more or less valuable. 
Membership of the group within the localized property system 
will doubtless change over time, leading to changed preferences. 
As the preferences drift, it is likely that translation costs will in-
crease over time, making convergence relatively more attractive. 
D.  Other Known Problems of Translation 
In stating that localized property systems are subject to 
translation costs, we do not intend to imply that only localized 
property systems are subject to such costs. In fact, translation 
problems can arise in other contexts, and, to some degree, prob-
lems of translation have previously been recognized in the liter-
ature, albeit only in several discrete contexts.193 
Most obviously, property claims that cross state lines pro-
vide a familiar example of property translation problems. These 
translation issues arise where people seek to enforce property 
rights established and recognized by one jurisdiction in another. 
Translation issues in such instances are subsumed into the larg-
er set of problems associated with the field of conflict of laws. 
Courts tackle translation problems by using conflict of laws 
 
 192 See, for example, Svensson, The Attainment of Limited Self-Determination at 271 
(cited in note 97).  
 193 Perhaps the most exotic context is “virtual” property. Virtual property rights are 
“property rights” owned by an imaginary character that exists in a game world. See, for 
example, Fairfield, 85 BU L Rev at 1058–64 (cited in note 8) (discussing property in “vir-
tual environments”). Because game worlds are quite extensive, involving hundreds of 
thousands of players, and players are themselves sufficiently entertained to invest bil-
lions (in the aggregate) in the games, virtual property rights can prove quite valuable. In 
2010, Jon Jacobs sold a virtual game “resort” in the Entropia Universe in a series of 
transactions for a total of $635,000. Oliver Chiang, Meet the Man Who Just Made a Half 
Million from the Sale of Virtual Property, Forbes (Nov 13, 2010), online at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverchiang/2010/11/13/meet-the-man-who-just-made-a-cool 
-half-million-from-the-sale-of-virtual-property (visited May 9, 2013). Obviously, translat-
ing virtual property rights into the real world poses significant challenges. See John Wil-
liam Nelson, The Virtual Property Problem: What Property Rights in Virtual Resources 
Might Look Like, How They Might Work, and Why They Are a Bad Idea, 41 McGeorge L 
Rev 281, 307–08 (2010).  
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principles to determine which legal system’s substantive rules 
ought to apply. A particularly striking instance of such efforts 
can be found in state law treatment of community property. 
Community property is a form of joint ownership of property 
that applies to certain kinds of spousal property acquired during 
marriage.194 Only a handful of states today recognize community 
property; other states restrict spouses to the forms of common 
ownership recognized in the common law.195 Courts must there-
fore use conflict of law principles to resolve disputes where, for 
example, a couple creates community property while domiciled 
in a community property jurisdiction, and the couple subse-
quently establishes its domicile in a non-community-property 
state.196 In earlier writings, we have participated in the scholarly 
debate about whether property rights should be more generally 
made available for migration.197 
Even without crossing state lines, ordinary property rights 
can give rise to translation issues. Various ordinary forms of 
property—cotenancies, leaseholds, etc.—involve two-tiered prop-
erty rights, in which one set of rules applies within the circle of 
owners (among cotenants, for example), while another set of 
rules applies outwards to the rest of the world. Internal ar-
rangements among co-owners must be translated to the outside 
world, and are subject to the obvious costs of education, incom-
patibility, and enforcement. 
 
 194 See ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommenda-
tions 22 (Matthew Bender 2002) (“Community-property law begins with the contrary 
presumption: all earnings from spousal labor during the marriage are the property of the 
marital ‘community’ in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest.”). 
 195 See id (stating that since there are only eight traditional community-property 
states and, of these, five instruct courts to divide property “equitably,” equitable distri-
bution is the “dominant rule” in the United States today).  
 196 See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 259 (1971). Comment (a) to § 259 
adds, “Considerations of fairness and convenience require that the spouses’ marital 
property interests . . . are not affected by a change of domicil to another state by one or 
both of the spouses.” Comment (b) provides, “If one or both spouses sell the property in 
their domicile and reinvest the proceeds in another asset, the new asset purchased with 
the proceeds retains the character of the original.” This is a departure from the usual 
conflict of laws rules applying to property, under which the situs of the object or the dom-
icile of the party establishes the relevant legal regime to apply. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflicts of Law § 258(1). 
 197 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 Yale 
L J 72, 80 (2005). 
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III.  WHY LOCALIZED PROPERTY DOES NOT ALWAYS CONVERGE 
Similar to the trend in technological settings, in the world of 
property, too, there exists constant pressure on localized proper-
ty regimes to conform to the dominant standard, namely, the 
formal legal system. The pressure toward convergence is a direct 
result of the translation problem. As we have explained, holders 
of localized property rights must incur translation costs when 
interacting with members of the public at large.198 The costs of 
translation therefore reduce the utility of localized property 
rights. Consequently, all things being equal, translation costs 
should drive larger state systems to incorporate and supplant 
localized property rights. 
As long as the benefit they derive from having specialized 
local property arrangements is greater than the cost associated 
with translation, participants in the localized property system 
will choose to preserve the localized regime. However, as their 
losses mount due to increased translation costs, so will the pres-
sure toward convergence—at least in most cases. As we will 
show, the two central variables—the benefits from localized 
property arrangements and translation costs—change over time. 
Hence, the analysis must be dynamic. 
One variable that affects the likelihood of convergence is the 
cost of transitioning from the localized property system to the 
larger state one. Even if members of the group respecting the lo-
calized property rights believe that the benefits of their localized 
property rights no longer justify the payment of translation 
costs, they may still hold on to their localized system. 
The reason for this is obvious. Transitioning to the state 
property system is potentially costly. If the state does not grant 
formal recognition or adequate tools for translating the localized 
property rights into state-recognized legal rights, property own-
ers will find themselves permanently subject to the losses of im-
perfect translation. If the state does incorporate the localized 
property rights, this will not necessarily result in convergence or 
reduce the translation costs to zero. Politicians and potential 
opponents may have to be persuaded to agree to the incorpora-
tion, and the very act of incorporation may harm some of the 
beneficial qualities of the localized property system. Some mem-
bers of society, both inside and outside the group, may feel that 
there is a benefit to maintaining the separate localized property 
 
 198 See Part II.A. 
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system alongside the regular state system. In some cases, the 
political result may be a formalized state recognition of the local-
ized property system, granting the rights state enforcement 
without full incorporation or interoperability of the rights. This, 
for instance, is the way the United States has traditionally dealt 
with some aspects of Native American property rights.199 But in 
other cases, no such complete formalization will be possible. In-
deed, in some cases, the very incompatibilities between the local-
ized property rights and state property rights that raise transla-
tion costs also raise transition costs. In such cases, the price of 
convergence for participants in the localized property system 
may be substantial amounts of wealth stored in localized property 
rights that cannot be transitioned to the state property system. 
In this Part, we examine some of the likely barriers to con-
vergence of localized and state property systems. In particular, 
we note the potential influence of the political process.200 Im-
portantly, we do not judge political outcomes against conver-
gence as necessarily bad or necessarily good. Sometimes the out-
comes will reflect the optimal result; other times, they will not. 
In any event, given this background, we show that we should 
expect to continue seeing partially incompatible property sys-
tems despite translation costs. 
A.  Community Preferences 
Localized property regimes often reflect community prefer-
ences. Community preferences may reflect a shared ideology, or 
culture, or simply a common interest of the group. When com-
munity preferences diverge sufficiently from those anchored in 
the state property system, community members can derive a 
benefit from opting out of the formal property system and adopt-
ing their own rules. Therefore, localized property regimes are 
especially resistant to convergence when they embody communi-
ty preferences that diverge from the norm, and such regimes 
may survive even in the face of increasing economic pressures to 
conform. 
Assume, for example, that a localized property regime is 
consistent with a certain ideology that is shared by all group 
members. An example of this is the property system used in ear-
 
 199 See Lilias Jones Jarding, Tribal-State Relations Involving Land and Resources in 
the Self-Determination Era, 57 Polit Rsrch Q 295, 296 (2004). 
 200 See Part III.C. 
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ly kibbutzim, based on the members’ shared commitment to 
communism as they understood it.201 In such cases, high costs of 
translation may not be sufficient to drive group members to 
adopt the state property system. The ideological benefits of sep-
aration from the state may be so high as to justify paying the 
high translation costs. Kibbutz members may so enjoy their 
communist ideological purity that they are more than willing to 
pay the price of losing the ability to utilize their localized prop-
erty rights in the surrounding society. 
Indeed, in some cases, members may view the translation 
costs as a valuable commitment mechanism. New members en-
tering the kibbutz understand that the rights they will receive 
as members—for instance, the right to live in a particular 
house—will not generally be translatable into the wider society. 
Because the rights received by the member can only be fully uti-
lized within the kibbutz, members lock themselves into high 
costs for economic transactions outside the community. These 
costs can serve as a penalty for defecting from community values 
and, therefore, as an important precommitment mechanism for 
members of the community.202 
Importantly, community preferences do not remain constant 
over time. They may change as a result of the entry or exit of 
new members with different preferences or because the original 
members changed the preferences they once had. External 
changes often serve as a catalyst in this process. Consider the 
effect of market prices on ideology (or culture), for example.203 
Even if the internal benefits of the local property remain stable, 
opportunity costs for the local property system may grow as 
greater gains can be realized in the outside, statewide property 
system. Up to a certain point, the members of a community with 
localized property norms may adhere to their original prefer-
ences. At a certain point the opportunity cost will become so 
large that it will overcome the ideological counterweight. At this 
point, the process of convergence will start and simultaneously 
the countervailing ideology will begin to erode. 
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Once community preferences change, the translation costs 
that penalize defection can no longer effectively serve as a 
means for binding together the community. On the contrary, the 
changed preferences lead the community as a whole to change 
the form of localized property rights so that the community as a 
whole will no longer have to pay such high translation costs. 
This is precisely what happened in the kibbutzim in Israel. 
The kibbutzim were founded on a collectivist ideology that 
shunned private property. For decades, members were not al-
lowed to have any private property rights; all resources were 
held by the collective.204 Over time, however, as the Israeli econ-
omy developed and younger members of kibbutzim realized that 
they could get significant returns on their labor if they left the 
kibbutz and offered services on the open market, they begin to 
leave kibbutzim en masse. This factor was one of the chief caus-
es of the financial collapse of kibbutzim in the 1980s.205 In re-
sponse, an increasing number of kibbutzim relaxed the ban on 
private property and started recognizing private property rights 
in members. Today, private property rights are the norm in most 
kibbutzim. Only a small group of well-to-do kibbutzim still abide 
by the old property regime.206 
Notwithstanding the experience of the kibbutzim in Israel, 
in some instances community preferences may thwart conver-
gence for long time periods. Even in Israel, it took decades until 
the forces of the market overcame the strong ideological com-
mitment of kibbutz members to ban private property. According-
ly, community preferences are an important mitigating force 
against convergence. 
B.  Transition Costs 
A second barrier to convergence is transition costs. Local-
ized property regimes sometimes arise out of necessity or path 
dependence. In such cases, they are not optimal even from the 
vantage point of the actors that abide by them. The informal 
property rights of favela residents provide a useful example. One 
can reasonably assume that the residents would be more than 
happy to have their rights formalized. Yet, it does not happen. 
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As is the case with any equilibrium, even an inefficient one,207 it 
is necessary to invest resources to effect a move to a more effi-
cient state of affairs. 
In this sense, our analysis parallels Professor Harold Dem-
setz’s famous account of the transition of property regimes from 
open access to private property.208 Professor Demsetz pointed out 
that even when the transition to private property rights is effi-
cient, it might nevertheless not occur on account of high transi-
tion costs. Formalizing property rights is costly. The introduc-
tion of property rights in new resources requires asset definition, 
recognition of rights in them, registration of the newly estab-
lished rights, and then enforcement of the rights.209 The aggregate 
cost of these tasks may outweigh the gains from privatization. 
The same can happen with respect to localized property 
rights. Informal property rights are prevalent in many countries 
in Latin America. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro represent a 
much broader phenomenon. Many economists, foremost among 
them de Soto, believe that there are enormous gains to be had 
from formalizing those rights.210 Currently, the informal rights 
cannot serve as collateral for securing financing. This, in turn, 
stunts economic growth. Formalizing those rights requires 
adopting expensive land reforms. Among other things, the state 
will have to clear away prior formalized titles to many of the re-
al estate assets that have been claimed under the localized 
property systems. In other cases, the state will have to provide a 
formal mechanism for recognizing transfers that already took 
place in violation of the formal rules.211 
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Some countries, like Peru, decided to bite the bullet and en-
act the necessary enabling legislation despite the price tag.212 
Other Latin American countries have refrained from taking this 
step. There are two possible explanations for the decision not to 
formalize localized property rights. First, the cost of passing the 
reform may be thought to exceed the projected benefit. Second, 
the reform may be blocked for political reasons. The difference 
between the two explanations is that in the former case, con-
verging the localized property system with the state system is 
welfare reducing, while in the latter case, the change might be 
welfare enhancing yet is not effected on account of narrow politi-
cal considerations or because it is not high enough on the politi-
cians’ priority list. We discuss these possibilities at greater 
length in the next Section. 
C.  Political Motivations 
A third force that sometimes countervails the pressure to-
ward convergence is political interests. As Professor Saul 
Levmore pointed out, the political processes—or more precisely, 
politicians—often thwart efficient changes in the world of prop-
erty.213 Changes in property regimes, he reminded us, are a 
product of the political process. Politicians, as self-interest max-
imizing agents, would often choose to block welfare-enhancing 
transitions when doing so can help them politically.214 
As an illustration consider the case of the kibbutzim in Isra-
el. Traditionally, the kibbutzim constituted the base of the Labor 
Party, which ruled Israel in the first few decades of its existence. 
It was clearly in the best interest of the Labor Party to do any-
thing in its power to act in tandem with the leaders of the kib-
butzim in order to preserve the dominant socialist ideology as 
well as the leadership. These narrow political interests enabled 
the kibbutzim to extract various political concessions and, more 
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importantly for our purposes, stave off the economic pressures 
that ultimately forced privatization on many kibbutzim.215 
The story of the Sámi in Norway (and other Scandinavian 
countries) is in many respects different from that of the kibbut-
zim in Israel, but it, too, highlights the significance of political 
considerations as an anticonvergence force. In order to preserve 
their traditional lifestyle, the Sámi and their reindeer herds 
need to cross over broad expanses of land.216 The migrating ways 
of the Sámi present a challenge to the Norwegian property sys-
tem. Yet, for cultural and ideological reasons, the political sys-
tem in Norway (as well as a big part of the population) is strong-
ly predisposed to protect the Sámi lifestyle, notwithstanding its 
cost.217 
One need not venture to far-off places to appreciate the ef-
fect of political motivations on localized property regimes. Local-
ized property rights in parking spots in the United States pro-
vide a fascinating example of the interaction between localized 
property arrangements and local politics. In his study of proper-
ty rights in parking spaces, Professor Epstein reports of the ex-
istence of a localized property norm in Chicago under which a 
person who cleared the snow off of a parking spot is entitled to it 
until the street is cleared of ice and snow by the municipality.218 
Urban activists opposed the practice for being unfair and ineffi-
cient, but it was staunchly defended by Mayor Richard M. Da-
ley, who said: “I tell people, if someone spends all that time dig-
ging their car out, do not drive in that spot. This is Chicago. Fair 
warning.”219 Clearly, local politicians are strongly disincentivized 
to overturn the norm for fear of the political price of doing so.220 
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Professor Mancur Olson has noted the ability of small, or-
ganized groups with a discrete interest in a goal that is very 
valuable to them to capture the political process.221 Such groups, 
on account of their superior organization, can prevail in the po-
litical arena over much larger yet disorganized groups and ex-
tract benefits at their expense.222 Communities and groups with 
localized property regimes often fit Professor Olson’s description 
of small, organized groups.223 Consequently, they—or more pre-
cisely, their leaders—can extract sufficient concessions from the 
political system to enable them to preserve localized property 
arrangements. 
Political opposition to transition can therefore arise in a va-
riety of circumstances. Politicians may oppose transition be-
cause they view the localized property systems as sufficiently 
important or valuable to the society at large to warrant the con-
tinued payment of translation costs. Alternatively, politicians 
may oppose transition because the systems are sufficiently valu-
able to a particularly powerful group that the political losses en-
tailed in convergence are greater than the political gains, even 
though convergence might be advantageous to society as a 
whole. 
IV.  TRANSLATION AND PROPERTY, GENERALLY 
Thus far, we have examined the popularity of localized 
property systems, described the translation costs they create 
when interacting with the statewide property system, and exam-
ined the reasons why localized property systems may resist in-
corporation and replacement by the state property system. We 
now turn to several broader issues of property theory illuminat-
ed by the phenomenon of localized property systems. 
A.  Commons 
Very few topics in property theory have attracted as much 
attention as the choice between private property and commons 
property.224 The opening salvo in the ongoing debate between the 
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champions of private property and the proponents of commons 
property can be traced back to Professor Demsetz’s seminal To-
ward a Theory of Property, in which he laid out a prima facie 
case for the superiority of private property regimes, at least from 
the perspective of efficiency.225 In a nutshell, Professor Demsetz 
argued that formalizing private property rights in resources 
eliminates a severe problem of negative externalities inimical to 
commons property. He showed that when a resource is held in 
common, actors have a tendency to overuse it since each of them 
derives the full marginal benefit of her use while paying only a 
small fraction of the marginal cost.226 This insight has commonly 
been associated with Professor Garrett Hardin’s gloomy predic-
tion that “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”227 
Subsequent contributions, among them the path-breaking 
work of Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, have challenged Profes-
sor Demsetz’s conclusion.228 Professor Ostrom, for one, has 
demonstrated that close-knit groups can come up with govern-
ance rules that can reduce the externalities problem to a man-
ageable level and solve the overuse problem.229 Others, foremost 
among them Professor Michael Heller, pointed out that the pro-
liferation of private property rights in resources may lead to se-
rious holdout problems, which result in underutilization of re-
sources.230 Professor Heller, following a lead from Professor Frank 
Michelman,231 labeled the latter phenomenon “anticommons.”232 
In this Section, we highlight a different, hitherto overlooked 
aspect of the debate concerning the choice between private prop-
erty and commons property. Earlier discussions have focused on 
the resource-by-resource transaction costs entailed in manage-
ment through private property or commons. We look at the  
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potential transaction costs created by interactions with the 
property systems. As we will show, including such costs in our 
analysis dramatically changes the analysis of commons problems. 
Debates to date have focused on the resource-by-resource 
transaction costs entailed in management through private prop-
erty or commons.233 On the one hand, scholars agree that, in 
high transaction cost environments, users may be expected to 
overconsume resources in the commons since users may partially 
externalize the costs of their use of any given resource while in-
ternalizing the full benefits.234 Thus, for instance, users of a fish-
ery held in the commons know that they can enjoy the full bene-
fit of any fish caught while suffering only a small portion of the 
costs of depleting the fishery. This phenomenon is commonly 
known as the “tragedy of the commons,” thanks to Professor 
Hardin’s famous article on the subject.235 On the other hand, 
where the transaction costs of governing strategies are suffi-
ciently low, close-knit communities may adopt governance rules 
and monitoring mechanisms,236 as well as social sanctions,237 to 
combat effectively the tendency of individual members to over-
use a common resource. Thus, Professor Ostrom showed that 
close-knit communities, such as Eskimos, have been able to craft 
rules preventing the depletion of fisheries held in the commons.238 
Resource-by-resource transaction costs are also responsible 
for the expected underconsumption of resources held by an ex-
cessive number of private owners. In such anticommons—as 
Professor Heller labels them—managing any given resource re-
quires aggregating the consent of numerous private property 
owners.239 Where transaction costs are too high, the vetoes cast 
by one or more of the owners will be final, and the resource will 
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remain unused to its best potential. Thus, Professor Heller cites, 
among others, the example of private Native American property 
rights in reservation land. In many cases, says Professor Heller, 
fractional shares have descended through several generations, 
creating a multiplicity of owners over the land, each with a tiny 
share of ownership in the whole.240 This has led to a collection of 
owners whose costs of coordination far exceed any reasonable 
prospect of earning utility from the land. Professor Heller offers 
the example of Tract 1305, valued at $8,000 but owned by 439 
owners, thus requiring $17,560 per year to coordinate payments 
of annual rent that aggregated to only $1,080 per year.241 The 
result, says Professor Heller, is a form of property that cannot 
possibly be cost-effectively managed, and is doomed to nonuse or 
nonproductive use.242 
Our contribution to this debate is in the observation that 
transaction costs also come in the form of translation costs. At 
core, our insight is very simple: once a given resource is man-
aged by a regime separate from the legal standard in a certain 
jurisdiction, it makes translating between the regime and the 
wider legal standard increasingly cumbersome. Accordingly, in a 
jurisdiction that generally recognizes private property as the 
dominant regime for resource management, communities that 
wish to adopt common property regimes for their own tight-knit 
group will incur much greater costs. Correlatively, the greater 
the deviation of the property regime from the default regime, the 
costlier it will be for the members of the community adhering to it. 
Our claim is based on the phenomenon of translation. Simp-
ly put, transaction-cost analyses not only must take account of 
the costs of bargaining for optimal use of any given resource, but 
they also must take into account the costs of bargaining across 
different property systems. 
Consider, for instance, Eskimo rights in a fishery. As Pro-
fessor Ostrom observes, the internal rules of the Eskimo com-
munity may prevent overfishing and thereby avoid the tragedy 
of the commons.243 However, the fact that the Eskimo rights are 
internal to the community means they cannot easily be translated 
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to outsiders. An Eskimo fisherman cannot trade rights in the 
fishery with outsiders, or use the rights as security for a loan. 
An interesting implication of our insight is that common re-
sources may sometimes be subject to under-, rather than over-, 
utilization. We submit that owing to translation costs, common 
resources might be left underdeveloped because the rights hold-
ers will be unable to achieve general recognition for any private 
rights they may obtain in objects they remove from the com-
mons. Importantly, the translation costs associated with com-
mons property cannot be lowered by the adoption of effective in-
ternal governance rules. Collective action mechanisms by close-
knit communities may successfully block members’ overuse of 
the common resource. However, these are intragroup measures 
whose effect is confined to members of the group and their rela-
tionships with one another. Hence, Professor Ostrom’s research 
offers no solution to the translation problem. In the situations 
described by Professor Ostrom, group governance can prevent 
overuse, but not underuse. 
Another implication of our analysis is that some kinds of an-
ticommons suffer even greater problems of underconsumption 
than realized by Professor Heller. Professor Heller focused on 
the likelihood of underconsumption where owners have high 
costs in coordinating with one another.244 But if the anticom-
mons arise within a localized property system, translation costs 
must be added to the coordination costs as a barrier to efficient 
use of the property. To return to the infamous Tract 1305 cited 
by Professor Heller, even if a new and dramatically cheaper sys-
tem of coordination were developed by the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs to permit managing the interests of the 439 owners, the 
property would still be undervalued because the limitations of 
transferability mean that any rights recognized by the Bureau 
and landowners cannot be easily translated into the wider prop-
erty systems of the United States.245 
Both in the cases cited by Professor Ostrom and in those by 
Professor Heller, the translation problem is largely external to 
the group. It arises from the gap between the property settings 
of the formal legal systems and the localized property rules 
adopted by a certain group or community. The adoption of an ef-
fective governance mechanism does not remedy the translation 
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problem and cannot remedy it. Our analysis suggests that irre-
spective of the governance mechanisms that apply to common 
resources, the mechanisms will often give rise to translation 
costs. 
B.  Semicommons 
Our translation analysis is also potentially relevant to a 
branch of the commons literature that focuses on mixtures of 
features of commons and private property called “semicom-
mons.” The term semicommons is often attributed to Professor 
Smith, and it refers to situations in which assets are managed 
with a mixture of commons and private property rights.246 The 
classic example cited by Professor Smith is the open fields sys-
tem used in England in the Middle Ages. In the open fields sys-
tem, peasants each privately owned delineated strips of land in 
one or more large fields within the village boundaries. However, 
alongside the peasants’ private rights in the land, there coexist-
ed a commons regime under which the land would have to be 
opened for grazing during specified times of the year.247 
Professor Smith posited that semicommons would arise 
where, in some places or for some uses, an asset could be most 
profitably managed by protecting private exclusion rights and 
leaving one person to be the gatekeeper for the asset, while at 
different times or for different uses the asset would be optimally 
managed through a governance regime, without a single gate-
keeper.248 The advantage of semicommons over commons re-
gimes could be found in the disciplining effects of partial private 
property. The strategic offloading of costs onto other users that 
characterizes commons regimes is less profitable in a well-
designed semicommons. At the same time, semicommons may 
prove cheaper to set up and manage than a full private property 
regime, and transaction costs among the semicommons owners 
may prove lower, making semicommons preferable in certain 
circumstances to full-scale private property.249 
A translation analysis adds a dynamic dimension to Profes-
sor Smith’s analysis. Following the path of Professor Demsetz, 
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Professor Smith imagines transitions between and among com-
mons, semicommons, and private property regimes as the values 
of the asset and various uses of it change, in contrast with the 
transaction costs involved in managing the property and transi-
tioning among regimes.250 We posit that one potentially hidden 
cost in the analysis is the cost of translation of semicommons ar-
rangements beyond the bounds of the community. Semicommons 
arrangements could certainly encourage efficient use among 
members of a community using an open field. However, because 
those rights are partially bound to the ongoing governance ar-
rangements with the community, there will necessarily be trans-
lation costs involved in moving to a different area, or in bringing 
in outsiders. These translation costs can thus exacerbate the 
standard costs involved in relocation and mobility. In medieval 
England, translation costs could extract a hidden price from the 
peasants twice: once by discouraging mobility and a second time 
by making transitions more costly where localities would have to 
translate old rights into new ones. 
The advantages of semicommons are therefore tightly linked 
to the pervasiveness of owner mobility and their potential desire 
to translate their rights to outsiders. The more dynamic the so-
ciety, the more costly semicommons regimes are, irrespective of 
the internal costs of managing a semicommons and encouraging 
optimal management and use. 
C.  Property Formalities 
A third field of scholarly inquiry for which our translation 
analysis holds relevance is the field of inquiry pioneered by Pe-
ruvian economist de Soto. De Soto is best known for his work on 
informal economies in the third world,251 and his thesis that an 
informational framework is the necessary backbone for the full 
enjoyment of property rights.252 For instance, de Soto writes that 
owners of assets in “informal” (that is, not fully legal) economic 
units like favelas enjoy property rights that cannot reach  
their full potential because the owners cannot use their rights to 
obtain credit. Unregistered and unrecognized rights cannot be 
mortgaged and used to secure loans. Unregistered and unrecog-
nized rights cannot easily be transferred to others. Unregistered 
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and unrecognized rights cannot easily be vindicated in courts  
of law.253 
Professor Jeffrey Stake summarized the costs of intransfer-
ability as they were pointed out in the economic literature: 
Economic theory would predict that where rights cannot be 
transferred, productivity will suffer. Omotunde, applying 
the analysis of Coase, Alchian and Demsetz to land tenure, 
argues that restrictions on the sale of land reduce invest-
ment in land by making it difficult to borrow for improve-
ments and by limiting an owner’s ways of capturing his in-
vestment. He concludes that there must be freedom and le-
legal enforcement of sale and rental contracts for a system 
of land tenure to facilitate wealth increases.254  
De Soto argues that formalizing property rights, and creat-
ing the informational framework for recognizing and vindicating 
those rights, is the key to unlocking their potential to create 
wealth. Once rights are properly registered, information about 
the property rights is available to a much wider audience, and 
the potential for realizing gains from the property is correspond-
ingly greater.255 
The relevance of de Soto’s work for our analysis of transla-
tion costs in localized property systems is obvious. Indeed, as we 
see it, de Soto’s argument explores one central aspect of the wid-
er phenomenon of localized property systems and their transla-
tion costs. As we argue, significant information costs can be cre-
ated by localized property systems and their differences with 
other property systems. However, these are not the only transla-
tion costs that must be considered. For instance, rights within 
localized property systems may be partially incompatible with 
state-recognized property rights. Thus, formalization of rights 
might come at the cost of losing some of the attractiveness of  
the structure of localized property rights. This is why, in some 
cases, “formalization” of rights—or in our parlance, convergence 
of localized property rights with the wider state property sys-
tem—may be disadvantageous. In other cases, of course, “for-
malization” is highly desirable. De Soto’s work is an important 
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contribution to the analysis of localized property systems, but it 
is incomplete. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have explored the phenomenon of local-
ized property systems and the interactions of such localized 
property systems with property law. In our exploration, we have 
looked both at the local systems themselves and at their impli-
cations for our broader understanding of the world of property. 
We began by showing the ubiquity of localized property sys-
tems. Some appear quite exotic, such as the informal property 
rights in favelas in Brazil, collective property rights in kibbut-
zim in Israel, or even virtual property rights in computer games. 
Other localized property systems are quite mundane, such as 
the quasi-property rights in urban parking spaces or the agreed-
upon property arrangements among roommates. In all events, 
localized property systems serve some need of the localized 
property users. The localized systems may be due to lower 
transaction costs thanks to ongoing relationships (roommates), 
ideological preferences (kibbutzim), flaws in property law or its 
satellite regulatory systems (favelas), or a variety of other rea-
sons. Whatever the reasons for the localized property systems, 
they are not costless. All localized property systems entail trans-
lation costs with the wider state property systems around them. 
Translation costs result from incompatibilities, as well as infor-
mation and enforcement costs. Some of the localized systems are 
adopted or recognized by state law; others are not. Systems that 
earn state recognition may benefit from lower translation costs, 
but they may only suffer from poor incorporation or from ossifi-
cation. In any event, state recognition of localized systems does 
not eliminate translation costs. 
One way of understanding the phenomenon of localized 
property systems is through the economic lens of network ef-
fects. The value of property arrangements increases as the num-
ber of people who abide by them goes up. The greater the num-
ber of adherents, the greater the utility of the property regime. 
These network effects, and the translation costs generated by lo-
calized property systems, create pressure for localized property 
systems to converge with the larger state property systems 
around them. But pressures for convergence may be resisted. 
Convergence is itself costly. The costs of transitioning may bar 
convergence, or the continued utility of the localized property 
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system may render convergence not cost-effective. Additionally, 
politics may block efficacious convergences of property systems. 
Our Article aims to provide the beginnings of an exploration 
of localized property systems and translation problems rather 
than a complete survey. We demonstrated that the insights 
identified in this Article have important and divergent implica-
tions for the theoretical work on common property, the semi-
commons, and property formalities. Specifically, we showed that 
the introduction of translation costs into the analysis calls into 
question the positions endorsed by property theorists on com-
mon and semicommon property, as well as the formalization of 
property rights in various resources. If our analysis is correct, 
policymakers must pay close heed to the problem of translation 
as they design future property systems. 
 
